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I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty years after the introduction of no-fault legislation in California, state
legislatures are challenged to restrain what was once considered a welcome revolu-
tion in domestic relations: no-fault divorce. When the divorce ground of no-fault
replaced the fault-specific grounds of adultery, cruelty and desertion, sociologists,
academics and lawmakers all united in condemnation of the past and welcome of
the new regime. Nonetheless, either as a direct result of, or attendant to no-fault
divorce, there are today significantly higher divorce rates than thirty years ago.'
Worse, there are concomitant surges in poverty among women and children. Chil-
dren involved in divorces are more prone to psychological disturbance, and they
experience far greater rates of poverty.2 Further, welfare costs to the states rose
Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America; Visiting Profes-
sor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1 It is estimated that nearly half of all married couples will divorce. See TERRY ARENDELL,
MOTHERS AND DIVORCE: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS 1 (1986). The number of divorces
each year has remained steady at around one million per annum throughout the 1980s and 1990s. See Laura
Gatland, Putting the Blame on No-Fault, 83 A.B.A. J. 50, 51 (1997).
2 See generally NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, A FAMILY PERSPECTIVE IN
CHURCH AND SOCIETY 4 (1998); COUNCIL ON FAMILIES IN AMERICA, MARRIAGE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO
THE NATION (1995); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN
AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 252-56 (1991) [hereinafter BEYOND RHETORIC]; Elizabeth Scott,
Rational Decision-Making About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9 (1990); James McLindon, Sepa-
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dramatically. 3 The issue thus arises: Should no-fault divorce be curtailed so as to
preserve the family for the sake of the children? Something has gone wrong. The
new-age augurs of sociologists, academics and lawmakers grapple with the for-
merly unthinkable, that the no-fault divorce revolution in America has failed. In-
creasingly, there are suggestions, among many possibilities, of a return to fault
divorce to keep families together. Robert Herrick's ode rings true:
Thus times do shift, each thing his turn does hold:
New things succeed, as former things grow old.4
The current reconsideration of no-fault legislation and with it the impor-
tance of marriage to economic security arrive at a propitious time. Three undercur-
rents within American society have converged to place marriage at the focus of
public scrutiny. First, the Hawaii Supreme Court decision of Baehr v. Lewins in-
toxicated civil and social conservatives and liberals with the possibility that the
definition of marriage has changed to incorporate two persons of the same sex.'
Meeting this challenge to what the United States Supreme Court has called "the
most important relation in life ... having more to do with the morals and civiliza-
tion of a people than any other institution,",7 federal and state legislatures statutorily
limited the definition of marriage as between a man and a woman.8 But the debate
rate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351 (1987);
Robert Cochran, Jr. & Paul Vitz, Child Protective Divorce Laws: A Response to the Effects of Parental Sepa-
ration on Children, 17 FAM. L.Q. 327 (1983).
3 Elimination of Aid to Families With Dependent Children and adoption of the 1996 Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Act have reduced overall welfare rolls by almost 50 percent from their
highs in 1994. Poverty rates among families with children headed by a single mother are down 5 percent from
the 1994 high. Those persons previously receiving welfare are reported to be in low-paying jobs or relying on
churches or family for support. See Mary Jo Bane, Poverty, Welfare and the Role of Churches, AMERICA,
Dec. 4, 1999, at 9.
4 Robert Herrick, Ceremonies for Candlemas Eve (citing Hesperides), quoted in JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 241 (16th ed. 1992).
5 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaii court has since held that a 1998 amendment to the state
constitution granting the state legislature the right to restrict marriage to persons of opposite sex removed the
matter from the ambit of equal protection. See Baehr v. Miike, 26 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1075 (Haw. 1999).
6 See generally WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1997); Raymond C. O'Brien, Single-Gender Marriage: A Religious
Perspective, 7 TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RGTS. L. REV. 429 (1998); David 0. Coolridge, Same-Sex Marriage?
Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1 (1997); William Galston, Public Morality
and Public Policy: The Case of Children and Family Policy, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 313 (1996).
7 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
8 See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified in scat-
tered sections of I U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C.). The Act provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or in-
terpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the
word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or wife.
I U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 1998).
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sparked reflection on the importance of marriage in society, and why marriage is
unique and trans-cultural.
In the national debate over whether two persons of the same-sex should be
denied a license to marry, the nation listened in on a class on marriage itself. State
legislatures discovered that getting divorced often took a year of residency, grounds
and litigation; getting married took a few days and a few dollars. Legislators con-
cluded that benign neglect had allowed persons easy access to the status of mar-
riage, sociologists found that poor education contributed to a failure to understand
the obligations of marriage, and academics found themselves unable to define an
essence to marriage as distinct and enduring. The debate over no-fault divorce is a
reawakening of an appreciation of marriage. State efforts are more often directed
towards no-fault divorce than marriage because, according to a Greek proverb fre-
quently quoted by St. Jerome: "It is easier to mend neglect than quicken love." 9
The second undercurrent posits that America has witnessed a major revolu-
tion in the way government distributes welfare. On August 22, 1996, President
Clinton signed into law Public Law 104-193, The Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).' ° The federal legislation ended
sixty-one years of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and replaced
it with a capped block-grant program to the states. Among other provisions, the
burden of distributing limited federal welfare funds shifts to the states. The states
are empowered by law to withdraw support from low-income parents and children
for any number of reasons, including failure to comply with employment require-
ments or participation in employment preparation, establishment of paternity, and
outright restrictions on providing aid to some immigrant families," unwed teenage
mothers, felons, and drug abusers.12 Previously, children whose parents met the
means-test defined by AFDC had a consistent safety net of support.13 This safety
net is now gone, replaced by Congress and the President with an "opportunity soci-
ety" 14 which fosters a culture of opportunity rather than entitlement and redistribu-
tion.
It is fair to point out that while the PRWORA eliminated the safety net for
poor families, it did provide additional federal mandates to collect support from
Saint Jerome, Letter 7, quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 113 (16th ed. 1992).
10 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
11 See City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 179 F.3d 29 (2d
Cir. 1999) (challenging provisions of the new welfare legislation restricting benefits to immigrants).
12 See generally Foreword to The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.
13 Aid to Dependent Children was established by the Social Security Act of 1935 and later renamed
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). The program was designed to provide cash welfare pay-
ments for needy children whose parents are unable to provide support and are incapacitated, absent from the
home continuously, deceased or unemployed. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 104TH CONG., 2D
SESS., BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS 383, 384 (Comm. Print 1996).
14 CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY, AND
THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THENATION 65-77 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
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parents which states must enforce. Thus there is a newly established case registry
and parent locator service, mandatory adoption of the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act, 5 access to all government and private information within multiple
computer networks, volume case processing, and expedited administrative proce-
dures to facilitate subpoena issuance and asset seizure. 16 The success of these col-
lection measures is still uncertain, although the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) reports child support recovery has increased twenty percent since
the welfare legislation became effective. 17 Still, almost eighty percent of parents
escape payment, and large numbers of children are unable to return to the safety net
of federal AFDC payments.
While AFDC may have fostered an atmosphere of entitlement, the new
welfare structure is meant to foster a work solution. Arguably, entitlement fostered
moral inculpability by supporting non-marital children, laziness, and a class of
persons termed the "undeserving poor." By mandating employment and limiting
both the time and the amounts of welfare to be received, PRWORA responds to a
tenet of American social policy: work is good. But if work is good, and work is at
the heart of the new welfare law, then feasibility of massive employment opportu-
nities today and in the future is necessary to provide an equitable result for custo-
dial parents and children. The absence of work opportunities will jeopardize the
linchpin of welfare legislation. Single parents unable to find employment and with-
out the safety net of welfare subsistence, have little recourse for themselves or for
their children. This is the argument made by both opponents and proponents of the
new welfare legislation.18
Albeit Malthusian, substantial evidence exists to support the conclusion
that the American economy is entering an employment-decreasing, post-industrial
phase.19 This phase is associated with corporate downsizing, cybernation, a global-
15 9 U.L.A. 255 (1996). See 42 U.S.C. § 666(F) (1997) (requiring states to enact the Uniform Inter-
state Family Support Act to receive federal funding of child support enforcement).
16 See generally Linda D. Elrod, Child Support Reassessed: Federalization of Enforcement Nears
Completion, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 695 (1997); Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support
Policy: Implications of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519 (1996).
17 See Judith Havemann, Child Support Recovery Has Gone up 20 Percent, WASH. POST, April 2,
1999, at A27 ("Child support collections have increased from $12 billion in 1996 to $14.4 billion in 1998.
The percentage of cases where some money was collected grew from 20.5 percent in 1996 to 22.1 percent in
1997.").
18 See, e.g., Status of Welfare Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the
House Ways and Means Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of J. Jean Roger, Department of Health and
Social Services, Madison, Wis.) (supporting the legislation); Glenn C. Loury, Welfare Pair, NEW REPUBLIC,
Jan. 5, 1998, at 10 (opposing the work possibilities).
19 See generally Alan Finder, Evidence is Scant That Workforce Leads to Full-Time Jobs, N.Y.
TIMEs, April 12, 1998, at 1; Stephen Franklin, Signals Mixed in Job Sector; Unemployment Falls, But Layoffs
Rising, CHI. TRIBUNE, Dec. 5, 1998, at I (citing loss of 245,000 factory jobs since March 1998); Steven
Greenhouse, Many Participants in Workfare Take the Place of City Workers, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 13, 1998, at
1; Thomas Hargrove, Federal Cutbacks Hit Blue-Collar Jobs Hardest, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 22,
1998, at 4 (citing more than 316,000 blue-collar positions that have been eliminated since 1993); Joel Kotkin,
A Look at... Downtown's Prospects; Fixing the Engine of Urban Life, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1999, at B3
(citing the erosion of well-paying blue collar jobs); Joel Kotkin and David Friedman, Put a Cork in It; As
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ized work force, and a sharply diminished need for labor in the production proc-
ess.20 The resurgence of the Asian economy will likely siphon additional jobs from
American low-wage workers. American unemployment is at its lowest rate in
twenty-nine years, but this statistic masks a drop in actual employment opportunity;
manufacturing has lost 3 81,000 jobs in the last twelve months, industrial machinery
firms lost 89,000, and the electrical equipment industry lost 69,000.21 If the post-
industrial age is identified by a decrease in jobs that would normally be held by
working poor, then the federal welfare legislation is at an impasse: Requiring work
is no longer an altemative if work is unavailable.
The economics of post-industrial unemployment is pertinent now because
of the poverty so attendant to divorce. This is dramatically true for children of di-
vorced parents, as they are far more likely to be poor than children of married par-
ents.22 Thus, the introduction of welfare legislation requiring employment, the eco-
nomic changes prefigured in a post-industrial society, and the significant number of
children experiencing poverty because of divorce, occur at a propitious time. If
there is a sharply diminished need for labor in the production process, parents will
be unable to find employment, particularly meaningful employment. If these condi-
tions presage increased poverty for children, it is logical for the state to keep par-
ents married, decrease opportunities for divorce, and maintain two-income house-
holds. No-fault divorce works in tandem with the new federal welfare legislation to
precipitate childhood poverty. This is why the states and commentators are con-
cemed with no-fault divorce.
But the welfare legislation does more than contribute to the chances of
poverty for children. The legislation establishes a definition of family which works
best for the state, and that definition incorporates marriage as a norm. The legisla-
tion significantly restricts support for single parents and children, creating disincen-
tives for forming such families. The welfare legislation identifies an undercurrent
in society which defines family within the confines of marriage. The legislation
makes marriage the norm.
A third undercurrent in American society is the flirtation between secular
political authorities and what one public policy analyst terms "faith-based moral
Wall Street Pats ltself on the Back Trouble Lurks Behind the Boom, WASH. POST, May 24, 1998, at C1
(citing dropping wages over the last decade for 20 percent of the bottom of the workforce); Patrick J.
McDonnell, Jobs Exist for Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1998, at BI (citing a decline in the number and
wages of low-paying blue-collar jobs); Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Inequality Amid Prosperity, WASH. POST,
July 9, 1997, at A23; Viewpoints, Simply Put: Workfare Doesn't Work, BUFFALO NEWS, June 20, 1997, at
C3.
20 See generally THOMAS MASSARO, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND UNITED STATES WELFARE
REFORM 234-36 (1998) [hereinafter MASSARO, SOCIAL TEACHING]; GARY TEEPLE, GLOBALIZATION AND
THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL REFORM (1995); JEREMY RIFKIN, THE END OF WORK: THE DECLINE OF THE
GLOBAL LABOR FORCE AND THE DAwN OF THE POST-MARKET ERA (1995); ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK
OFNATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21sT-CENTURY CAPITALISM (1991).
21 John M. Berry, US. Jobless Rate Lowest in 29 Years, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1999, at DI1.
22 BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, at 253 ("Children who live with only one parent, usually their
mothers, are six times as likely to be poor as children who live with both parents.').
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principles., 23 Specifically, secular authorities - the states - are adopting positions
and programs long associated with religious sponsorship. For example, two states
have adopted covenant marriage legislation and other states have considered it.
24
Covenant marriage allows a couple to restrict divorce within that state to grounds
normally associated with fault divorce, grounds derived from religious-based di-
vorce grounds. Another state, Florida, has adopted a program which requires high
schools to educate students about the permanence of marriage, and the state allows
for marriage preparation and parenting classes that are conducted by religious de-
nominations and pastors.25 Thus, legislation and judicial decisions have accommo-
dated faith-based principles which further secular public policy, 26 and allowed for
couples to enter into marriage which may only be dissolved upon traditional reli-
gious grounds of adultery, cruelty and desertion.
State accommodation of religious programs has been a necessary staple in
American public policy; state benefits accommodate an incidental religious mis-
sion. For example, Sunday closing laws possess a particular religious identification,
but the state accommodates this basis within neutral public policies of rest and lei-
sure.27 But in a religiously plural society, how far may a state go in utilizing reli-
gious practices and programs? Often what is really at issue is the ability of a major-
ity of persons who happen to share a religious belief plus a political majority to
enact their religious beliefs into public legislation. For example, litigation has re-
sulted because a public school in a predominantly Christian area of the country
incorporates Christian prayer into its public events. 2a A non-Christian in that area
may well object to the inclusion of Christian prayers into public events as the estab-
lishment of religion. Or in another example, if a state demands that a couple enter-
ing into marriage, or contemplating divorce, participate in a religious program
which will sustain the marriage and preserve the family, is such a program estab-
lishment of religion? Florida's adoption of plans to teach marriage in high schools
and require counseling upon divorce are developments which test the limits of reli-
23 MASSARO, SOCIAL TEACHING. supra note 20, at xiii.
24 Louisiana and Arizona have adopted covenant marriage. See generally Melissa S. LaBauve, Cove-
nant Marriages: A Guise for Lasting Commitment?, 43 Loy. L. REv. 421 (1997); Melissa Lawton, Note, The
Constitutionality of Covenant Marriage Laws, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2471 (1998).
25 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.246(1) (West Supp. 1999) (high school graduation); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.0305 (West Supp. 1999) (premarital preparation course); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.21(1) (West Supp.
1999) (parenting course).
26 See, e.g., Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998) (permitting school vouchers to be used
at sectarian and non-sectarian schools); Kagin v. Kopowski, 10 F. Supp. 2d 756 (E.D. Ky. 1998)(ordering all
divorcing parents to take parental counseling program conducted by an agency of the Catholic Church); Witt
v. Ristaino, 701 A.2d 1227 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (ordering non-custodial parent to pay for parochial
education even though no particular educational need).
27 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
28 See, e.g., Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68
U.S.L.W. 3325 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1999) (No. 99-62) (deciding if public football games in a small Texas town
could begin with prayers); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1985) (finding an Alabama statute uncon-
stitutional for mandating a period of silence in public schools so the students and teachers might engage in
meditation or voluntary prayer) (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984)).
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gious accommodation but also demonstrate a reawakening of an appreciation of
marriage.
It is natural that the state would turn to religion for assistance with social
issues. Religious institutions, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, provide a
plethora of social services. The state has been a partner with religion in providing
these services as long as the services are not "pervasively sectarian., 29 The partner-
ship spans from infant and maternity homes, to hospice and elderly facilities. Fed-
eral and state monetary contributions are significant. Indeed, with the exception of
the vast educational network sponsored by the church, the majority of monetary
support for religious-sponsored programs comes not from bishops' annual appeals,
but from state and federal grants and United Way contributions.30 Cities and states
are either considering or adopting voucher programs which would allow public
funds to be used at private schools, indicating an expansion of the integration of
religious and secular efforts.3' And there are other examples of such expansion.
Recently a federal district court upheld the constitutionality of an order of
a Kentucky circuit court which required all divorcing parents to take a parental
counseling program run by an agency of the Roman Catholic Church.32 Only those
couples with minor children are required to attend such courses and each partici-
pant must pay a $15 registration fee. The program is presented by laypeople, who
may or may not be Roman Catholic, and there is no evidence that the program ex-
plicitly teaches Catholic doctrine, nor is there any effort at conversion of the par-
ties.34 The court rejected an establishment argument, holding that the program
sponsored by the church promotes the interests of the state by promoting family
harmony and minimizing litigation. 5 Any program which had the same non-
sectarian purpose could be substituted for the one administered by the church.'
The Kentucky parental counseling program is an effort to keep couples to-
gether and to protect children from the consequences of divorce. As is being dis-
cussed in many legislatures, the issue is whether the state is willing to utilize the
vast network of religious programs designed to prepare couples for marriage, coun-
sel them during marital difficulties, and imply that divorce is not an acceptable
29 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
30 See CHARLES R. MORRIS, AMERICAN CATHOLIC 313 (1997).
31 See, e.g., Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998) (holding that a state voucher program
by which students could attend private nonsectarian schools with state funds has a secular purpose and does
not violate the Establishment Clause).
32 See Kagin v. Kopowski, 10 F. Supp. 2d 756 (E.D. Ky. 1998).
3 See id at 758.
34 See id. New legislation in Florida allows the court to require either or both parties to consult with a
marriage counselor, psychologist, psychiatrist, minister, priest, rabbi or other person deemed qualified by the
court and acceptable to the party or parties. The consultation may only delay the proceedings up to three
months. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.052 (2)(b)1&2 (West Supp. 1999).
35 See Kagin, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
36 See id. at 761.
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option. Through such programs states are developing a renewed appreciation of
marriage as an institution. The most significant program to date, Florida's Marriage
Preparation and Preservation Act37 presents the opportunity for stronger state utili-
zation of religious programs enhancing marriage and family preservation. The flir-
tation between secular authorities and faith-based religious programs proffers op-
portunities for both. Secular authorities have a public policy investment in a family
structure which will provide for economic and social security for the participants
and their children. For religion, this is an opportunity to evangelize within a neutral
state purpose.
This Article concludes that the convergent societal pressures from the
same-sex marriage debate, the effect of the welfare legislation to define family, and
the allowance of greater religious involvement in marriage preparation and divorce
will precipitate a reawakening of marriage. The emergence of covenant marriage,
the public debate over no-fault divorce, the resurgence of fault grounds, and Flor-
ida's enactment of its Marriage Preparation and Preservation Act are ramifications
of this reawakening. Public concern over the frequency of divorce and the resulting
adverse consequences for children and adults, indicate a change in attitude concern-
ing marriage, divorce and family. Covenant marriage is simply the beginning of
this process; the Florida legislation is a better and more involved approach. The
litigation over same-sex marriage and the adoption of sweeping changes to welfare
distribution in the United States focus new attention on the importance of marriage
and its attendant responsibilities; they focus attention on the family. Thus, thirty
years after no-fault divorce, attention shifts from no-fault opportunities to marriage
instruction.
It seems reasonable that other states will increasingly follow the lead of
Florida and incorporate secular and religious instructional programs that seek to
strengthen the institution of marriage. Such state efforts reflect state interests in
protecting children and adults by providing for stability in relationships through a
better appreciation of marriage rather than more difficulty in obtaining a divorce. In
so doing, the state will tangentially recreate a more secure definition of family, one
less individualistic and more committed to the parties' viability. If the state is suc-
cessful in reawakening an appreciation of form marriage, then the question arises as
to what effect this will have upon functional relationships such as domestic partner-
ships or reciprocal beneficiaries.38 Surely too much time has passed to denigrate the
commitment of couples committed to relationships other than marriage. It is likely
that the reawakening of marriage will allow for increased recognition of alterna-
tives to marriage as these alternatives will be less threatening.
37 1998 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 98-403 (West) (codified at scattered sections of FLA. STAT. ANN. (West
Supp. 1999)).
38 See, e.g., H.B. 118, 19th Leg., Regular Sess. (Haw. 1997) (providing a detailed list of benefits for
reciprocal beneficiaries).
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II. DIVORCE
A. The Demise of Marriage
The millennium ends with a report from the Rutgers University's National
Marriage Project finding that "Americans are less likely to marry than ever be-
fore. ' 39 The report should not come as a surprise since statistics conceming the
demise of what was considered the typical American family forty years ago have
been very clear in direction for more than a decade. This dissolution of the Ameri-
can family is not a result of the availability of divorce, but rather the irrelevance of
marriage. And marriage is at the heart of what has been termed "form family."
40
Past legislation, judicial decisions and numerous academic surveys record the im-
portance of marriage and what can be defined as "form family."4' If marriage is the
most important relation in life, a fundamental right,42 its glory lay in media por-
trayal and parental participation. Old movies and television sitcoms consistently
portrayed suitors asking parents for the hand of a daughter, the welcoming of a son-
in-law to the family and the fighting but eventual reconciliation in many a mar-
riage. This all changed.
It is arguable that marriage suffered a demise because the formalities to en-
ter into marriage were too lax. Marriage was cheapened by its easy availability.
True, many states today allow for common law marriage, provable through a hold-
ing out as husband and wife of two qualified persons for a sufficient period of
time.43 In the remaining states, the requisite formalities of a valid marriage, even
the requiring of a license, are not absolutely necessary.44 Requirements as to minis-
ter, a blood test, and waiting periods are minimal at best, each accommodated
within the rhetoric of a fundamental right to marry.45 Formalities have been consis-
tently minimized, the substance of the relationship derived instead from the marital
commitment between the two parties. Marital commitment is filtered through a
media message which never addresses the difference between a couple living to-
gether outside of marriage and one living together within the marital relationship.
The media makes both out to be at-will relationships, easily dissolvable at will of
39 Michael A. Fletcher, For Better or Worse, Marriage Hits a Low, WASH. POST, July 2, 1999, at
Al. The report found that the nation's marriage rate has fallen by 43 percent in the past four decades, from
87.5 marriages per 1,000 unmarried women in 1960 to 49.7 marriages per 1,000 unmarried women in 1996.
See id.
40 See infra note 41.
41 See City of Ladue v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (defining form family as "[o]ne
or more persons related by blood, marriage or adoption ... as an individual housekeeping organization").
42 See Zablocki v. Redhall, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(defining marriage as fundamental to our very existence and survival).
43 See, e.g., Crosson v. Crosson, 668 So. 2d 868 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995).
44 See, e.g., Nelson v. Marshall, 869 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
45 For a discussion of the formalities, see HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 85-100 (2d ed. 1987).
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either party.
As the states minimized their objective restrictions on entering into the
marriage, the individuality of the marital contract as subjectively formed by the
couple itself increased. This individuality lessens the objective identity of marriage,
making it less easily defined,46 and thus significant numbers of commentators offer
the conclusion that marriage is less a social force.47 Couples had to balance many
factors heretofore assumed within the objective confines of what it meant to be
married. For example, large numbers of women entered the workforce, establishing
two-paycheck families, and with husband and wife working, and each earning a
salary, marital duties strictly associated with gender became blurred.4 8 The father
was expected to do home and child-rearing functions; the wife was expected to earn
a living, keep and advance at employment, and provide for the material needs of the
family. This role obfuscation made marriage less secure; negating some of the
popular media messages, and implied that religious structfires of marriage, which
had provided a natural law permanence, were less natural and hence not necessarily
permanent.49
Religious organizations were slow to recognize the changes in society,
perhaps because of denial but perhaps because they too were undergoing change
and were preoccupied. Changes in marriage, family and responsibility soon af-
fected every facet of religious observance. Religion, ordering a bond that is indis-
soluble if not always sacramental, was caught in the maelstrom of social change.
46 See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (remanding to the lower court for a determina-
tion to assess the compelling state interest associated with prohibition of same-sex marriages). Upon remand,
the Circuit Court of Hawaii found that the state failed to demonstrate a compelling state interest to demon-
strate that the public interest in the well being of children would be adversely affected by same-sex marriage.
See Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 31, 1996). Before the Hawaii
Supreme Court could act upon the remand, the people of Hawaii adopted a constitutional amendment defining
marriage as between persons of the opposite sex. The Hawaii constitutional amendment permitted Hawaii
legislators to forbid marriage between persons of the same sex, thus deflating the preceding judicial efforts.
Nonetheless, the controversy prompted Hawaii to become the first state to pass a comprehensive statewide
domestic partnership statute seeking to equalize benefits between couples of the same and couples of the
opposite sex. These benefits include health insurance, retirement, inheritance, election against a partner's last
will and testament, and wrongful death rights. See H.B. 118, 19th Leg., Regular Sess. (Haw. 1997). The
constitutional amendment has made the issue of same-sex marriage moot. See Baehr v. Miike, 26 Fam. L.
Rep. (BNA) 1075 (Haw. 1999).
47 See, e.g., David Blankenhom, The State of the Family and the Family Policy Debate, 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 431 (1996); Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage,
62 VA. L. REv. 663 (1976); Victoria Mikesell Mather, Evolution and Revolution in Family Law, 25 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 405 (1993).
48 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981); J.
THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1997); June R.
Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce
Reform, 65 TUL. L. REv. 953 (1991); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and
Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303 (1994). For an excellent analysis of the gender obfuscation caused by
depriving men of traditional roles associated with power and replacing the roles with a culture of adornment,
see SUSAN FALUDI, STIFFED (1999).
49 See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 62 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) (quoting the trial
judge, asserting that the Deity may have changed His mind as to interracial marriages and trial judges are not
the ultimate authorities on the subject of the permanence of the Divine Will)).
[Vol. 102:339
THE REAWAKENING OF MARRIAGE
The disruption occurred not because of the introduction of no-fault divorce, but
because of reluctance to grasp the change going on in marriage itself. American
Catholic bishops admitted the upheaval. Writing in preparation for the United Na-
tions' International Year of the Family in 1994, they wrote to family members:
We know you face obstacles as you try to maintain strong family
ties and to follow your calling as a church of the home. The rapid
pace of social change; the religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity
of our society; the revolution of values within our culture; the in-
trusion of mass media; the impact of political and economic
conditions: all these place families under considerable social
stress.50
The stress has been brought on by role redefinition and the development of
a heightened sense of individualism. Professor Mary Ann Glendon recognized the
shift in attitude nearly twenty years ago, opining that the family exists for the bene-
fit of the individual and not the individual existing for the benefit of the family. 1
There was the added stress of feminism, a status which incorporated both single
mothers and single women. 2 There was also an unparalleled mass media blitz
which deprived the American religious culture its segregated sanctuaries. Charles
R. Morris, writing of American Catholics, makes a link to what happened to all
religions by the middle of the twentieth century. There was, according to the au-
thor:
the gradual secularization of the lower and middle classes. Tradi-
tional ethnic communities were breaking up - not just Catholic
and Jewish urban villages, but Midwestem Lutheran farm towns
and southern Baptist hamlets. The postwar generation was assimi-
lating into a broader American culture that, if not quite areligious,
was at least highly latitudinarian.53
No one can deny that the American media establishes values, especially
among the young in their most formative years. In recognition of this, the National
Commission On Children recommends that "parents be more vigilant and aggres-
sive guardians of their children's moral development, monitoring the values to
which their children are exposed, discussing conflicting messages with their chil-
l
50 l4ational Conference of Catholic Bishops, Follow the Way of Love, in 6 PASTORAL LETTERS AND
STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS (1989-1997) at 595 (Patrick W. Carey ed., 1998).
51 See generally GLENDON, supra note 48. Catholic social theory integrates individuality and inter-
dependence in the following: "Human dignity is reflected in one's ability to live life manifesting a healthy
balance between autonomy and interdependence." CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA, TRANSFORMING THE
WELFARE SYSTEM: A POSITION PAPER OF CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA 4 (1994).
52 For an integration of welfare reform, feminism and motherhood, see generally Linda J. Lancey, As
American as Parenthood and Apple Pie: Neutered Mothers, Breadwinning Fathers, and Welfare Rhetoric, 82
CORNELL L. REv. 79 (1996) (book review).
53 MORRIS, supra note 30, at 254.
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dren, and if necessary, limiting or precluding their children's exposure to images
that parents consider offensive." 4 But the American media culture also levels dis-
tinctiveness, tolerating only minimal uniqueness as a sort of flavoring in an amal-
gam called pluralism. It is interesting that in a culture so devoted to individuality,
the effect of the American media is one of amalgamation. And the media effect
upon religion is either patronizing or combative, never neutral. Regarding marriage,
the media presents a choice between staunchly affirming the religious sound byte:
"Wives be submissive to your husbands," or lingering on the impotence of religion
to complement a failing family unit. Religion is portrayed as either a powerful
bully or an mawkish wisp. Few media depictions scrutinize the religious underpin-
nings of marriage.
In spite of the Pope's massive popularity with the media as he travels from
culture to confrontation, religions themselves have been slow to adapt to the media
age. Few understand that the message is being lost and the image being televised is
newsworthy only because it is curious or eccentric. Most religious messengers find
themselves accepting the inevitability of social change, and responding to each
social movement with a clarification or sparing disagreement. The message is being
lost. There are televangelist programs, and the American Catholic bishops admitted
as much with their issuance of a pastoral letter in 1985 proposing utilization of "all
available communication media" in the promotion of its mission. 5 But religion is
largely unable to compete in secular media channels of information.5 Financial
considerations predominate, and often religious broadcasting finds itself preaching
to the choir rather than providing a voice in the marketplace.
The inability to convey a message concerning marriage is part of the
church's failure to communicate effectively. If marriage is ever to regain a preemi-
nence among social institutions it will need a religious contribution. Religion can
provide a moral content, a transnational and transcendental base. Harvard law pro-
fessor Mary Ann Glendon laments that laws in America are unique in that they are
stripped of any moral premise. 7 In her words, laws are not just rules of behavior.
They are constitutive - they express, and help define, who people are. "What sort
of meaning is family law creating and what sort of society is it helping to consti-
tute?"5 8 The constitutiveness of American law must take into account the different
gender roles and responsibilities, the pervasiveness of human sexuality, the as-
cendency of individualism, and relate them to an anthropomorphic level. Likewise,
religion must both respond to this secular standard and offer a constructive pro-
54 BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, at xxxiv.
55 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, In the Sight of All, Communications a Vision All Can
Share, in 5 PASTORAL LETTERS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS (1983-1988) at 181 (Hugh J.
Nolan ed., 1989).
5 There was a time when the secular media and religion relied on each other to respectively portray
dogma and sell movie seats. These were the days of movies like The Bells of St. Mary's and Going My Way
during the 1940s. See MORRIS, supra note 30, at 196-200.
57 See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
58 Id. at 9.
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posal for the future. American Catholic bishops now emphasize that:
Marriage is the partnership of a man and a woman equal in dignity
and value [and] ... a couple who accepts their equality as sons
and daughters in the Lord will honor and cherish one another ....
They will "be subordinate to one another out of reverence for
Christ" (Eph. 5:21) .... True equality, understood as mutuality, is
not measuring out tasks (who prepares meals, who supervises
homework, and so forth)... [it] leads to a joyful willingness ....
Both of you are co-creators of your relationship.59
Human sexuality is pervasive in the American media; religion presents it
as an aspect of the marital relation. The American Catholic bishops write that:
Sexuality... is not merely a mater of biology nor is it simply a
source of personal pleasure .... It is realized in a truly human
way only if it is an integral part of the love by which a man and a
woman commit themselves totally to one another until death ....
In truth, the Church teaches that there are two aspects of marital
intercourse - the .strengthening of the interpersonal unity be-
tween the spouses and the procreation of new life.6"
The influence of the American culture upon the bishops' statements is un-
mistakable; so too, the statements have a marked resemblance to creedal statements
of other denominations, some non-Christian. While some may disagree, there is
evidence, that in addition to pluralism, the statements offer proof of the cultural
shift in the definition of marriage. There is less emphasis upon divinity and more
acceptance of the individual. The objective must be to incorporate both within the
mutuality of the union. The effort to do this is current. When the definition of mar-
riage was changing in the American culture and nothing was being said to accom-
modate religious transcendence, a vacuum resulted. During this vacuum divorce
became more of an option. Indeed, divorce became an acceptable option, if for no
other reason than that marriage had lost its transcendence and external standards.
Instead, "people are free to defifie 'right and wrong' pretty much as they please. 61
To reawaken marriage, the institution's transcendence must be reasserted and one
of the methods by which this may occur is through religion.
The reestablishment of marital transcendence does not necessarily have to
be religious. Virtue and altruism, and even patriotic fervor could suffice. For exam-
ple, commentators offer a transcendent standard when they argue that no-fault di-
59 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, supra note 50, at 600.
6 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Human Sexuality from God's Perspective, in 6
PASTORAL LETTERS AND STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS (1989-1997) at 529
(Patrick W. Carey ed., 1998).
61 MORRIS, supra note 30, at 419.
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vorce should be abolished because of the need to protect the children. Mutual satis-
faction of the marital parties, stability in relationships, less predatory sex and eco-
nomic enterprise could easily be others. However, simply eliminating or curtailing
no-fault divorce is not an appropriate standard as it is inherently punitive and would
handicap only those with too little funds to travel to other more lenient jurisdic-
tions. 62 But all of these standards are being debated. No-fault divorce is simply an
effect of the demise of marriage. All discussion inevitably leads towards reawaken-
ing a distinctiveness in marriage. Religious institutions have the most accessible
and recognizable message, but the reawakening of marriage is not a religious phe-
nomenon alone, it is a cultural one.
B. The Rise of No-Fault Divorce
Prior to the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century there was no
statutory divorce in the Western world.63 Annulment, which established the fact
that no marriage ever existed because of certain defined grounds was the only way,
other than death of one of the parties, to end a marriage. Because Protestant re-
formers rejected the status of marriage as a religious sacrament, marriage became
primarily a civil matter with religious blessing. Eventually, American civil authori-
ties followed the lead of Protestant England and allowed for marriage to be dis-
solved when one of the parties committed a fault so great as to go to the heart of the
marriage. Divorce could be merely from bed and board, a mensa et thoro, provid-
ing for legal separation but no possibility of remarriage, or the divorce could be
final, a vinculo matrimoni, allowing for remarriage. Either divorce could be ob-
tained primarily upon the common law fault grounds of desertion, adultery or cru-
elty; states would eventually add other grounds by statute.6
4
Corroboration was required to prove a fault ground and only the innocent
party was allowed to petition for the divorce. Hence the phrase, "she won't give me
a divorce," was synonymous with the right of the innocent party to file against the
one at fault. Corroboration was often a product of collusion between the two mar-
ried parties seeking to end a moribund marriage. Thus, pictures dramatizing the
"disposition for and occasion to" commit adultery was all that was required; never
did the court require actual pictures of intercourse. Thus, as one New York judge
observed, "She is always in a sheer pink robe. It's never blue - always pink. And
he is always in his shorts when they catch him. 65 Likewise, cruelty had to be of
62 For an early yet dispositive discussion of migratory divorce, see generally W. Barton Leach,
Divorce by Plane-Ticket in the Affluent Society - With a Side Order of Jurisprudence, 14 U. KAN. L. REV.
549 (1966).
63 For historical perspective on marriage and divorce in the Christian milieu and its impact upon
American law, see JOSEPH MARTOS, DOORS TO THE SACRED 343-91 (1991).
6 The regional nature of divorce laws and attendant judicial maneuvers are discussed in LAWRENCE
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 204-08 (2d. ed. 1985). For a summary of the history of no-fault
divorce, see Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L.
REv. 649 (1984).
65 Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault, Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32, 33 (1966)
[Vol. 102:339
THE REA WAKENING OFMARRIAGE
such an extent that it went to the heart of the marriage, but some judges allowed for
verbal or repeated annoying acts to constitute sufficient cruelty to dissolve the mar-
riage. Desertion required that one of the parties be absent for at least a year with the
intent to desert; the other party had to want to reunite with the absent party.
Even if fault could be proven, there were four common law defenses to any
petition for divorce. Sometimes these went beyond the common law and were codi-
fied. For example, laches required the aggrieved party to file a timely petition for
divorce, while recrimination demanded that the petitioner not have committed an
equally egregious offense. Condonation occurred when the petitioner forgave the
offense, proven by intimate conduct after knowledge of the particular offense. Col-
lusion was used by the court to deny a divorce when both of the parties fabricated
evidence to support the divorce petition. Finally, connivance was used by the re-
spondent to assert that the petitioner was actually responsible for the offense. This
occurs when respondent asserts that he or she would never have committed the
fault upon which the divorce is petitioned, had the petitioner not afforded the op-
portunity to commit the offense.6
Fault litigation and the ensuing common law defenses must have been the
forerunner to daytime soap operas. Upon its stage, the many petty insults and in-
sinuations existent in bad marriages found revenge. Judges resented the travesty of
collusive parties petitioning for divorce. And there was the unfair opportunity for
many wealthy state residents to fly to foreign jurisdictions and avoid the embar-
rassment of a state dissolution hearing. Legislatures were mindful of the burden on
state courts forced to adjudicate personal details of adult lives. Commentators ques-
tioned the necessity and the function of the state in dissolving a status which was
increasingly becoming a private matter between two consenting adults. At least in
more modem countries, the stage was set for a revision of the divorce laws.
In 1964 the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury appointed a committee to
review divorce in England. In 1966 that committee submitted the Mortimer Report
which recommended that divorce be granted in England upon a no-fault ground. 7
In America, in 1965, the Supreme Court established the constitutional right of pri-
vacy between two married adults in Griswold v. Connecticut6 8 a guarantee of pri-
vacy which would soon extend to single adults in Eisenstadt v. Baird.69 America
was witnessing a burgeoning right of individual privacy and liberty. The stage was
(quoting N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Oct. 1, 1965, at 19). See also Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage:
Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 659 (1984) (describing the use of paid actresses
in collusive adultery situations, admitting they knew the husband, the husband would blush and cry, and then
the judge would dissolve the marriage).
6 See, e.g., Sargent v. Sargent, 114 A. 428 (N.J. 1920) (denying the petitioning husband a divorce
based on adultery, when the husband afforded his wife ample opportunity to commit adultery with the cou-
ple's chauffeur).
67 VALTER WVADLINGTON & RAYMOND O'BREN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS
70 (4th ed. 1998) (quoting PUTTING ASUNDER, A DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (1966)
(report of a group appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in January 1964)).
68 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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set for California to become the first state to provide for no-fault divorce in 1969.
The no-fault ground was based upon irreconcilable differences which caused the
irremediable breakdown of the marriage. 70 This no-fault panacea eliminated the
need for an innocent party, common law defenses and extensive litigation related to
adultery, desertion or cruelty. Corroboration of the testimony of one of the parties,
with or without fault, that the marriage was irreconcilable, was sufficient to end the
union.
By 1970 the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws voted to make irretrievable breakdown the sole ground for divorce. The Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act was subsequently approved and a definition of
irretrievable was offered: the parties have separated for more than 180 days because
of serious marital discord.71 In 1974 the American Bar Association ratified what
was by then a sweeping movement towards no-fault divorce, and today every state
has some form of no-fault legislation,72 though some states retain the traditional
fault grounds for divorce as well.73
The number of divorces increased prodigiously after the introduction of
no-fault. Some estimates are that no-fault was responsible for almost one-fifth of
the increase in divorces between 1968 and 1988. 74 Indeed, the divorce rate actually
doubled from 1960 to 1990. 75 Nonetheless, after rising rapidly for decades, the
divorce rate in the United States has leveled. The cumulative number of divorces
granted in 1997 was 1,163,000, a 1 percent increase over the number for 1996.76
These statistics concerning the rise in the divorce rate during the twentieth century
must be viewed from the perspective of the nineteenth. In 1867, 9,937 divorces
were granted; by 1900, 55,000 couples were divorced that year.77 This increase
occurred during the time of "fault-only" divorce and amidst warnings that divorce
would destroy the fabric of the republic and was a direct result of excessive indi-
vidualism and self-indulgence. 78 Thus, the conclusion is that a steady and rapid rise
in the number of divorces is not unique to the latter half of the twentieth century.
70 See CALIF. FAM. CODE § 2310(a) (West 1999).
71 9A U.L.A. 91 (1973).
72 See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Of Welfare Re-
form, Child Support, and Relocation, 30 FAM. L.Q. 765 (1997).
73 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1 (1999) (combining 10 grounds for divorce); see also W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-4 (1999).
74 See Maggie Gallagher, Jersey's Assault on Marriage, N.Y. POST, Oct. 28, 1998, at 27 (citing
American Economic Review).
75 See Peter T. Kilbom, Shifts in Families Reach a Plateau, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1996,
at A16.
76 See MONTHLY VITAL STAT. RPT. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), July 28, 1998, at
3. In 1996, there were 4.3 divorces per 1,000 population. See MONTHLY VITAL STAT. RPT. (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention), July 17, 1997, at 12.
77 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 500 (1985).
78 See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 10-11 (1985).
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No-fault divorce, a recent addition to American history, can easily be seen
as the culprit. Thirty years after California's adoption of no-fault legislation, there
are repeated attempts to curtail no-fault divorce, the argument being that an easy
divorce has resulted -in the destruction of the American family. The argument
against no-fault does not involve a curtailment of individual liberty, but argues that
marriage and family occupy a singular and important role in America, especially
when children are involved. Thus, no-fault should be curtailed for the sake of the
children. The National Commission on Children emphasizes this premise:
Families formed by marriage - where two caring adults are
committed to one another and to their children - provide the best
environment for bringing children into the world and supporting
their growth and development. Where this commitment is lacking,
children are less likely to receive care and nurturing, as well as ba-
sic material support. Research on the effects of single parenthood
confirms that children who grow up without the support and per-
sonal involvement of both parents are more vulnerable to prob-
lems throughout childhood and into their adult lives. 9
The premise of stability for children and the adverse consequences of easy
divorce for adults was a motivating factor for the Florida legislature when it passed
legislation concerning marriage preparation, consultation upon petitioning for di-
vorce, and parenting courses for couples. 80 Florida concentrated on the need to de-
velop family support mechanisms rather than divorce prohibitions. The premise
was based on legislative findings that: "Parental conflict related to divorce is a so-
cietal concern because children suffer potential short-term and long-term detrimen-
tal economic, emotional, and educational effects during this difficult period of fam-
ily transition."81 Eventually, arguments were made against divorce which were
premised upon the parties themselves, not the children. Economically, "women in
marriages at or near poverty levels have between a one-third (for Black women) to
one-fifth (for Caucasian women) chance of being at or below poverty level after
divorce. 82 Furthermore, there is no improvement in the economic condition of
these women after five years. Psychologically, "divorced and separated persons
have increased risk of suicide, psychopathology, homicide, and death due to illness
79 BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, at 251.
80 See 1998 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 98-403, § 2 (West) ("Just as the family is the foundation of society,
the marital relationship is the foundation of the family. Consequently, strengthening marriages can only lead
to stronger families, children, and communities, as well as a stronger economy.").
81 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.21(1)(a) (West Supp. 1999).
82 Steven L. Sayers et al., Prevention of Marital Dysfunction: Behavioral Approaches and Beyond,
18 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 713, 715 (1998). See generally KATHERINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW:
THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 348-49 (1993).
83 Sayers et al., supra note 82, at 715.
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compared with married persons."'
For women and men with greater financial resources, divorce has fewer
economic disadvantages and far more "expressive opportunities and freedoms."'8
Even the emotional trauma of divorce can be viewed as a "temporary and transient
condition, marking the first step in the journey toward greater self-awareness and
strength.,8 6 Women find self-sufficiency through competence, managing money
and professional lives. And, "whereas men were once socially pressured to conform
to the norms of monogamous marriage and responsible fatherhood, the new free-
doms of divorce provided cultural dispensation from these obligations even as post
divorce arrangements often made it harder for men to meet these obligations."87
These opportunities for individual liberty, be they foreshadowed by adversity for
the economically disadvantaged or ability for the select few, the picture is pre-
dominantly negative when children are involved. "As family members children
cannot act as unfettered individuals pursuing self-interests."8 8 The time before no-
fault was a time of greater marital permanence, it was a time when "the obligation
to preserve the marriage reflected the deeper understanding that marital stability
and child well-being were culturally linked."89 In choosing divorce, parents find
their goals in conflict with the well-being of their children and efforts to inhibit
divorce are efforts to protect children. The National Commission on Children pro-
vides research as to the economic and social adjustment of children upon divorce:
Children who live with only one parent, usually their mothers, are
six times as likely to be poor as children who live with both par-
ents. They also suffer more emotional, behavioral, and intellectual
problems. They are at greater risk of dropping out of school, alco-
hol and drug use, adolescent pregnancy and childbearing, juvenile
delinquency, mental illness, and suicide .... At most ages, prob-
lems seem to be more pronounced for sons than for daughters. 90
84 Id.
85 BARBARA WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE 57 (1997).
Id. at 60.
87 Id. at 57-58.
88 Id. at 153.
89 Id. at 142
so BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, at 253. See generally JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA
BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES (1989); Paul R. Amato & Alan Booth, A Perspective Study of Divorce and
Parent-Child Relationships, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 356 (1996); Paul R. Amato et al., Parental Divorce,
Marital Conflict, and Offspring Well-Being During Early Adulthood, 73 SOC. FORCES 895 (1995); Frank F.
Furstenberg, Jr., & Julien 0. Teitler, Reconsidering the Effects of Marital Disruption: What Happens to
Children of Divorce in Early Adulthood?, 15 J. FAM. ISSUES 173 (1994); Jean M. Muransky & Darlene De-
Marie-Dreblow, Differences Between High School Students from Intact and Divorced Families, 23 J.
DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE 187 (1995); Pamela S. Webster et al., Effects of Childhood Family Background
on Adult Marital Quality and Perceived Stability, 101 AM. J. SOC. 404 (1995).
[Vol. 102:339
THE REA WAKENING OF MARRIAGE
In America, "the proportion of children under 18 years living with two
parents declined from 85 percent in 1970 to 69 percent in 1995." 91 What rose stead-
ily during this same period was the poverty rate among children.92 Reports cite
rising divorce rates and delaying of marriage among adults as two of the major
factors. Undoubtedly, protection of children in this post no-fault divorce age ignites
efforts to curtail divorce access in America. But not everyone is convinced that the
children of divorce are in fact much different from children from intact marriages.9 3
One argument is that divorce is better than forcing a child to live in a home where
violence is a common denominator to settle family disputes. Statistics state that if a
child grows up in a home where violence is practiced, that child is far more likely
to commit violence. 94 Yet there is statistical evidence that the type of violence con-
templated is present in only ten or fifteen percent of marriages, 9' not sufficient to
justify easy access to divorce.
Lack of uniformity of statistical data has not impeded state legislatures
from enacting statutes which allow couples to restrict divorce options through mar-
riage covenants freely entered into by themselves at the time of marriage. Legisla-
tures, commentators and academics debate other reform measures. It is arguable
that efforts to reform divorce and strengthen marriage for the protection of adults
and children result in part from the heightened awareness given to marriage through
the debate over the rights of two persons of the same-sex to enter into marriage. At
a minimum that debate over same-sex marriage focused attention on the require-
ments for entering marriage. The debate reawakened marriage by demanding an
objective definition of marriage.
91 U.S. CENsus BUREAU, DEMOGRAPHIC STATE OFTHENATION 1997 at3 (1997).
92 See Richard W. Stevenson, Black-White Economic Gap is Narrowing, White House Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 1998, at A16 ("The combination of strong economy and Government programs like the
earned-income tax credit... helped push the poverty rate among children down to 20.5 percent in 1996 from
22.7 percent in 1993, following a relatively steady rise that started in 1969."). Additional statistics indicate
the vast poverty and its effects upon children. See Raymond C. O'Brien, An Argument for the Inclusion of
Children Without Medicare, 33 U. LOUISVILLEJ. FAM. LAW 567, 606-09 (1995).
93 The core of the debate over whether to change present no-fault divorce laws centers on the effect
that divorce has on children. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, To Fault or Not to Fault, NAT'L L.J., May 13,,
1996, at A19; Barbara Ehrenreich, In Defense of Splitting Up, TIME, Apr. 8, 1996, at 80. Yet, any time a child
resides in a single-parent household, the probability of poverty ensuing rises dramatically. See generally
James McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21
FAM. L.Q. 351 (1987). Psychological problems may ensue, too. See generally Robert Cochran, Jr., & Paul
Vitz, Child Protective Divorce Laws: A Response to the Effects of Parental Separation on Children, 17 FAM.
L.Q. 327 (1983); COUNCIL ON FAMILIES IN AMERICA, MARRIAGE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION
(1995).
94 See, e.g., Ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982). Some social commentators
argue that corporal punishment of children by parents is linked to other types of family violence. See, e.g.,
Murray A. Stauss & Carrie L. Yodanis, Corporal Punishment by Parents: Implications for Primary Preven-
tion of Assaults on Spouses and Children, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35, 37 (1995).
95 See BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, at 253. Research shows that 70 percent of divorces occur in
what are termed low-conflict marriages. See Tim Swarens, Securing the Bonds of Marriage, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, July 31, 1998, at A22 (quoting from PAUL AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK (1997)).
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C. Marriage Revisited: The Same-Sex Marriage Debate
Perhaps because of an innate understanding based upon biblical history
and past social contracting, the definition of marriage always seemed a given,
something everyone understood. Indeed, many states neglected to offer a definition
of marriage, relying on public understanding. The federal government was a moot
partner, relying on the federal exception to domestic relations jurisdiction to insu-
late itself from statutory and common law requirements for marriage.96 Even in the
less formal marriages, common law97 and putative spouse,98 a public policy was
operative which set the parameters of marriage. If the parties met this minimum
definition, then the state was willing to establish and protect their contract with the
penumbra of status. This status, which recognized the state's third-party involve-
ment, was protected through doctrines such as the presumption of the validity of
the most recent marriage,99 and marriage by estoppel.'ro
The definition of marriage which was always assumed, involved two per-
sons of the opposite sex.lnl This definition would eventually become codified in
state statutes and in the federal Defense of Marriage Act.1 0 2 The Hawaii case of
Baehr v. Lewin'03 challenged the assumption of opposite-sex marriage and in so
doing fostered a national debate over the definition of marriage, the uniqueness of
96 The federal exception to domestic relations jurisdiction is based on Congress's exercise of its
Article III power under the Constitution, which grants jurisdiction to the federal courts. The federal courts
recognize a narrow ban on domestic relations matters involving divorce, alimony and child custody. The most
recent ratification of this domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction is Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504
U.S. 689 (1992).
97 See CLARK, JR., supra note 45, at 100-24. The following states allow for common law marriage:
Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Texas, and the District of Columbia.
98 See UNIF. MAR. AND Div. ACT OF 1970 § 209, 9A U.L.A. 192 (1998) (as amended in 1971 &
1973) (recognizing putative marriage).
99 See, e.g., Hewitt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 490 F. Supp. 1358 (E.D. Va. 1980); Peter
Swisher & David Jones, The Last-in-Time Marriage Presumption, 29 FAM. L.Q. 409 (1995).
100 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Recknor, 138 Cal. App. 3d 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding one of
the parties estopped from denying the validity of the marriage).
101 See Dean v. District of Columbia, 18 Fam. L. Rptr. 1387 (D.C. Super. Ct., June 2, 1992), aff'd,
No. 92-CV-737, 1995 WL 21117 (D.C. Ct. App. Jan 19, 1995); De Santo v. Bamsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
102 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or any ruling, regulation, or inter-
pretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the
word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.
Id.
103 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). After the case was remanded back to the trial court it became Baehr v.
Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The court has since declared the contro-
versy moot. See Baehr v. Miike, 26 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1075 (Haw. 1999).
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marriage, and the impact of marriage upon children. The debate and court action
in Hawaii prompted the Hawaii legislature to pass a comprehensive domestic part-
nership statute providing for reciprocal beneficiaries between partners who would
otherwise be unable to marry.'05 The benefits include those previously reserved for
married couples: health insurance, inheritance rights, workers compensation bene-
fits, family and funeral leave, and legal standing to petition for wrongful death and
victim's rights.' 6
The Hawaii case itself involved two women, Genora Dancel and Ninia
Baehr.107 They were joined by a gay male couple and another lesbian couple.1
0 8
Their argument was that they met all of the requirements of the state of Hawaii for
marriage except they were "both of the same sex and for this reason [were] not
capable of forming a valid marriage contract within the meaning of [the law]."'109
The plaintiffs argued that the state could not bar them from obtaining a marriage
license based on this reason.110 Specifically, the gay and lesbian couples asserted
that the state's denial of same-sex marriage was a violation of the couple's right to
privacy as guaranteed by the Hawaii Constitution;11' second, that the denial of a
marriage license was a violation of the right to equal protection and due process of
law as guaranteed by the Hawaii Constitution. 1 2 Interestingly, the Hawaii suit fol-
lowed what has become a common pattern in recent civil rights litigation: the peti-
tion is brought in state courts, based on state constitutional rights rather than federal
guarantees.'
13
104 See, e.g., WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY
TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1997); SAME SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997);
Richard Posner, Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? And f So, Who Should Decide?, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1578 (1997); Lynn Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 8 (1997).
105 See 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 118. Very few persons have registered as reciprocal partners since the
law was enacted. See Hawaii Domestic Partners Law a Bust, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 1997, at A14.
106 See 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 118.
107 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
108 See id.
109 Id. at 50 n.3. See Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 32
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 196-203 (1995); O'Brien, supra note 6, at 439-44.
110 See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 50.
ill See id.; see also HAw. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized and
shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative
steps to implement this right.").
112 See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 50; see also HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 5 ("No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied
the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race,
religion, sex or ancestry.").
113 See, e.g., Powell v. Georgia, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (holding that the state constitution's guar-
antee of the right to privacy voids the state's sodomy statute). "It is a well-recognized principle that a state
court is free to interpret its state constitution in any way that does not violate principles of federal law, and
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The circuit court denied the plaintiffs' claim,1 14 and on appeal the Hawaii
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state must provide a compelling state
interest to justify its refusal to provide a same-sex couple with a license to marry. 15
The court's rationale was based on three parts, each of which contributed to both
the holding and the debate over the unique status of marriage. First, the court ac-
knowledged that authority to grant licenses to solemnize marriage allows the state
to discriminate based on sex in the exercise of the civil right of marriage. 16 This
presents an equal protection claim. The Hawaii Constitution provides that: "no
person shall ... be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the en-
joyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise
thereof because of race, religion, sex, or ancestry."'1 17 This feature, unlike the fed-
eral constitution, prohibits state-sanctioned discrimination against any person on
the basis of sex.
Second, once the Hawaii court held that awarding a marriage license to
opposite sex couples and not same-sex couples was a violation of equal protection,
the question arose as to whether such a policy is justified because of the unique
definition of marriage. The court did not find that the definition of marriage pre-
cluded the equal protection argument,118 although such a rationale had provided the
basis for refusal to award a marriage license in previous cases.119 The Hawaii court
refuted the definition argument with analysis derived from Loving v. Virginia.2'
Like Baehr, Loving was a marriage case. The facts involved an African-
American woman and a Caucasian man who sought to marry in the Commonwealth
of Virginia. Denied a marriage license solely because of race, they went to the Dis-
trict of Columbia, where interracial marriage was legal, and were married there.
Subsequently, they returned to live in Virginia. Once domiciled in Virginia, the
couple was indicted, and convicted of violating Virginia's miscegenation statute
which prohibited marriage between a Caucasian and a person of any other race. The
Supreme Court of Virginia upheld their conviction and the couple appealed to the
thereby grant individuals more rights than those provided by the U.S. Constitution." Id. at 22 n.3.
114 See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 53.
115 See id. at 64.
116 See id. at 59. Note that the court does not hold that there is a fundamental right for same-sex
couples to marry:
[W]e do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions and
collective conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would violate the funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions. Neither do we believe that a right to same-sex marriage is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sac-
rificed.
Id. at 57.
117 See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5.
118 See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60, n.20.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
120 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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United States Supreme Court on due process and equal protection grounds. 2'
Among other arguments, the state argued the statute was constitutional because the
definition of marriage did not include a marriage between a Caucasian and a person
of any other race. "[I]nterracial marriage simply could not exist because the Deity
had deemed such a union intrinsically unnatural,"" 2 and the customs of the state
had never included it as a possibility. But the Supreme Court implied that customs
could change, indeed, times could change, and the definition of marriage could not
bar the issuance of a marriage license to an interracial couple.
The Hawaii court adopted the "times have changed" rationale of Loving,
including the bar to same-sex marriages presented by natural law or references to
the Deity.123 Thus, if time could allow for interracial couples to marry, time could
allow for same-sex couples to marry. The definition of marriage could change with
changing circumstances. And once the definition bar was removed, the court was
able to progress to the third step in its analysis, requiring the state to provide a
compelling state interest to deny the plaintiffs' claim to a marriage license.
Courts are constrained to apply one of three levels of scrutiny: strict, in-
termediate or rational. 124 The Hawaii Constitution contained an Equal Rights
Amendment which, the court reasoned, raised the level of scrutiny involving sex-
based classifications under equal protection to the highest level, strict scrutiny.125
Thus, the state's action in barring the same-sex couples from obtaining a marriage
license is presumed to be unconstitutional unless, "the State of Hawaii, can show
that (a) the statute's sex-based classification is justified by compelling state inter-
ests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of the
applicant couples' constitutional rights.' 26 To determine if the state could provide
a compelling state interest, the case was remanded to the lower court for a hear-
ing.'
27
On December 3, 1996, the circuit court found that the state of Hawaii had
failed provide a compelling state interest which would deny persons of the same
sex the right to marry in the state.' 28 The state had argued many of the elements
mentioned before to justify restrictions on divorce: preservation of marriage and
insulation from the devastating effects of poverty which often results from a child
being raised in a single parent home. Specifically, the state found it compelling to
121 See id. at 12.
122 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 3).
123 See id ("[W]e do not believe that trial judges are the ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine
Will... "').
124 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1451-66 (1988).
125 See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
126 Id.
127 See id. at 67.
128 See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). See generally
David 0. Coolridge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. TEx. L. REv.
1(1997).
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"promote the optimal development of children as, all things being equal, it is best
for a child that it be raised in a single home by its parents, or at least by a married
male and female.' 29 In rejecting the state's effort to provide a compelling state
interest, the court held: "[The state] has failed to present sufficient credible evi-
dence which demonstrates that the public interest in the well-being of children and
families, or the optimal development of children would be adversely affected by
same-sex marriage.'
30
The circuit court, having found no compelling state interest, allowed the
Supreme Court of Hawaii to order the state to issue marriage licenses to persons of
the same sex. The supreme court never did that; the state legislature intervened and
submitted a constitutional amendment to the electorate allowing the legislature to
prohibit same-sex marriage. This constitutional amendment was approved over-
whelmingly by the voters in Hawaii at the November 1998 election.' 3' The consti-
tutional amendment halted the eight-year anticipation of the three same-sex couples
originating the suit and brought to an end any further consideration of this particu-
lar issue by the courts in Hawaii. 3 2 An Alaska Superior Court judge had also ruled
that the state's marriage laws should withstand strict scrutiny under the Privacy
Clause of the Alaska State Constitution, 3 3 but the Alaska voters negated any re-
view by passing a constitutional amendment of their own rejecting same-sex mar-
riages in the state.' 34
Vermont is the most recent state to visit the issue of marriage benefits. On
December 20, 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the Common Benefits
Clause of the state constitution demanded that same-sex couples in a committed
relationship have access to the same economic benefits as married couples.135 The
court directed the state legislature to enact legislation which would provide for
equality of benefits.'3 The issue is, in part, whether a domestic partnership ar-
rangement similar to Hawaii will provide common benefits. Another part is the
debate over the essence of marriage and the benefits which derive from it. Similar
129 Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *3.
130 Id. at *21.
131 See Sam Howe Verhovek, From Same-Sex Marriages to Gambling, Voters Speak, N.Y TIMES,
Nov. 5, 1998, atBl.
132 See Baehr v. Miike, 26 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1075 (Haw. 1999).
133 See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct.
Feb. 27, 1998).
134 Alaska and Hawaii voters passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage on the
same day. See State Ballot Limitations: Among Top Ballot Issues Decided Tuesday, WASH. POST, Nov. 5,
1998, at A46; see also HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.
135 See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). Legislation providing for civil unions be-
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discussions occur in Canada and France.' 37 '
Many conclusions may be drawn from the judicial and legislative debate
over the right of same-sex adults to marry. It is certain that the debate will continue
in spite of constitutional amendments and the passage of both the federal Defense
of Marriage Act and the Hawaii reciprocal partners benefit package. The latter, an
extensive form of domestic partnership, provides most of the economic benefits of
marriage to same-sex couples and arguably, is a precursor to marriage. 38 But a
benefits package is not marriage, and proponents of the right of same-sex couples
to marry will continue to seek that right. The chief attorney for a major gay and
lesbian organization stated the matter succinctly when he said: "What happened in
Hawaii was disappointing, but this is a national civil rights movement that will
continue, and we have gone from something that didn't exist to something that's
being discussed in every comer of the country." 39 It is something which is being
discussed in foreign legislatures and courts as well. 4°
No matter which side prevails on the subject of same-sex marriage, every-
one will have been involved in a debate over the nature and meaning of marriage.
Drawn from a moribund stupor, debate is prompting a national consensus over
marriage and what it means. There are those who think the institution should be
separated from economic benefits and entitlements and, concurrently,' 41 be rejected
by gay and lesbian couples. Others argue the contrary:
It is hard to imagine any action more likely to lift the sexual out-
law onus than the legalization of same-sex marriage. In one step,
society would confer, perforce, the symbolic legitimation of inti-
macy that is always implicit in the celebration of a marriage. It
would be a civic recognition of shared humanity like no other that
gay people have ever experienced. But it could only come with
marriage.
142
Because the definition of marriage was at the heart of the Hawaii decision,
what is being discussed is the definition of marriage. The same is true in Vermont.
137 See Steven Pearlstein, Canada Moves to Give Benefits to Gay Couples, WASH. POST., Feb. 12,
2000, at A15; Charles Trueheart, Gay Unions Legalized in France, Unmarried Couples Win Equal Rights,
WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1999, atAI7.
138 See O'Brien, supra note 109, at 218-20. But see O'Brien, supra note 6, at 482-84.
139 See Lisa Keen, Voters Just Say No, WASH. BLADE, Nov. 6, 1998, at 27.
140 See, e.g., Trueheart, supra note 137, at A17; Charles Trueheart, French Right Nixes Unmarried
Couples Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1998, at A20; Kai Wright, French Partners Bill Is Becoming a Political
Football, WASH. BLADE, July 10, 1998, at 10.
141 See generally, e.g., Paula Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family
Recognition, 5 J. L. & POLICY 107 (1996); Steven Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
505 (1994); Nancy Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will
Not Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1525 (1993).
142 Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values by a "Simu-
lacrum of Marriage," 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699, 1783-84 (1998).
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The fact that gay and lesbian persons prompt the reawakening of the debate should
not obfuscate the issue. The debate is over marriage: "Who decides what is mar-
riage: the people, directly or through their elected representatives, or the courts?
What is marriage: A contract between autonomous individuals? An intimate, com-
mitted relationship? A unique male-female sexual community?,, 143 This is the de-
bate which coincides with a restriction in welfare policy and concern over children.
It is the debate which prompts a re-evaluation of divorce and no-fault legislation. It
is a debate which inspires persons to form covenant marriage communities and
eventually, covenant marriage itself. Finally, it is a debate which sponsors of the
Florida legislation considered even as they were adopting the Marriage Preparation
and Preservation Act. When all is said and done, the Hawaii debate over same-sex




It is a fair assertion that covenant marriage developed from a grassroots
level. Many of the sponsors are persons primarily associated with evangelical
Christian beliefs and practices. 144 Some of the sponsors are lobbyists and some are
public policy advocates. For example, the Center for Arizona Policy contributed to
draft legislation which was eventually ratified in Arizona, 145 and a group of Chris-
tian Legal Society attorneys formed Indiana Attorneys for Covenant Marriage, to
sponsor a covenant marriage bill in Indiana.146 And at the Bethany World Prayer
Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, the only marriages they perform are covenant
marriages 147 the practice arising from a "message of commitment [which] seems to
be slowly percolating through the community. 148
In essence, covenant marriage allows a couple to voluntarily eliminate the
possibility of no-fault divorce in that state which has adopted it. While covenant
143 David Ogden Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Anal-
ogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 210,238 (1998).
144 Louisiana State Representative Tony Perkins is a member of Promise Keepers, an evangelical
Christian men's group and many persons who spoke in favor of the legislation were members of Christian
religious organizations. See Hearing on House Bill No. 756 Before the Civil Law and Procedure Comm.,
1997 Reg. Sess. (La. 1997).
145 See Heather Shulick, New Law Will Lock Women Into Abusive Marriages, Foes Say, TUCSON
CITIZEN, June 2, 1998, at IA. Other groups would include: the Institute for American Values, the Georgia
Family Council, the Michigan Family Forum, the Minnesota Family Council, American for Divorce Reform,
the Indiana Family Institute and the Coalition for Marriage, Family and Couples Education.
146 See Maureen Hayden, Indiana Attorneys'Billfor "Covenant Marriage" Falls Short, EVANSVILLE
COURIER & PRESS, Feb. 27, 1999, at Cl.
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marriage shares a religious basis of commitment, the process adopts the more secu-
lar right of an individual to choose a form of marriage less easily dissoluble upon
divorce. For example, in Louisiana, a couple can choose to undergo premarital
counseling and enter into a type of premarital agreement by which their marriage
may only be dissolved upon grounds resembling common law fault.149 No-fault is
not an option in the state for them. In 1997, Louisiana became the first state to al-
low couples to enter into covenant marriage. Since then bills were considered in
Alabama, Alaska, California, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Wash-
ington and West Virginia.10 Each of the legislative efforts to enact the law failed
except in one other state, Arizona, where covenant marriage was enacted in
1998. s
Louisiana allows for covenant marriage in the context of fault divorce. 52
An innocent party to the marriage may bring an action for divorce only if at least
one of the following grounds exists: (1) adultery; (2) commission of a felony and
sentence to death or imprisonment at hard labor; (3) abandonment for at least one
year; (4) physical or sexual abuse of the spouse or a child of either party; or (5)
continuous physical separation of the parties for at least two years; one year separa-
tion without reconciliation since entry of a separation judgement unless there are
children of the marriage and-then the period is extended to eighteen months unless
a basis for the separation judgment was abuse of a child. 153 There are reduced re-
quirements if there are no minor children, and, whatever the ground, the couple
must undergo counseling before the divorce may be granted."s The objective is to
make marriage more of a commitment, to encourage the couple to work out diffi-
culties, and to give parties time to think of reasons why they should remain mar-
ried. Surveys show that most divorced couples wish they had spent more time seek-
ing to work through their difficulties before getting divorced.55 Thus, even though
physical separation for two years could be considered a no-fault ground, the
lengthy period of time required would bring about the desired objective.
Once covenant marriage was enacted, Louisiana prepared a pamphlet de-
scribing the option for couples considering marriage in the state. Couples already
married could "upgrade" their marriage licenses. Obviously there was publicity
surrounding the enactment of the legislation, some calling the option a "high-test"
149 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272-73 (West Supp. 1998).
ISO See Mary Otto, "Save Marriage" Push: Classes, Tougher Laws, SEATrLE TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, at
A9.
151 See 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws 135.
152 See discussion of fault, supra Part II.B.
153 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:307 (1998).
1s4 See id.
1S5 See Virginia Norton, Couples Wish They Persisted; Councils Urge Marriage Prep, FLA. TIMES-
UNION (Jacksonville), July 2, 1998, at B2; Editorial, If Love Can't Keep Us Together, Laws Won't,
COLUMBIAN, Mar. 5, 1999, at A12.
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form of marriage, rather than "regular." Nonetheless, covenant marriage has not
been popular; only 3 percent of newlywed couples have chosen covenant mar-
riage.1 s6 Approximately 500 covenant marriage licenses have been issued, another
600 to married couples, including fifty from out of state.'57 This number is far
lower than might have been expected.
One reason why so few couples enter into covenant marriage is opposition
from many religious denominations. The Roman Catholic Church does not recog-
nize divorce in any form, allowing annulment of the marriage only under certain
circumstances. 58 Thus, to allow a couple to enter into a marriage which could be
dissolved on any ground other than death of one of the parties would be contrary to
church doctrine.' 59 Similarly, Carmen Pate, president of the Washington-based
Concerned Women for America, also rejects the proposal, saying that: "All mar-
riages are covenants established by God and we don't have the right to create other
categories. '' 60 Other groups and persons think that the covenants are unenforce-
able, promote a lifetime commitment but still provide for divorce, and only prolong
the inevitable.' 6' Others think that such legislation fosters government intrusion
into personal marriage vows, and Eleanor Eisenberg, executive director of the Ari-
zona Civil Liberties Union has said that "women and children will find themselves
trapped in abusive marriages.' 62 Even if the marriage is less than abusive, others
argue that: "Couples who stay married merely for the sake of the kids do provide a
household with both parents present, but rarely can you consider it an intact family.
Ask any kid who grew up in such an environment: The atmosphere is chilling."' 6
At present, no-fault divorce is still available in both Louisiana and Ari-
zona, the two states which have enacted covenant marriage. No-fault in Louisiana
is quite liberal, requiring only a six month residency period,' 64 and separation for
156 See Cheryl Wetzstein, Erosion of Marriage, Morals Seen in Millennium; Experts Concerned
About Social Cost of Family Collapse, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1998, at Al. See also Janet McConnaughey,
Covenant Marriages Slow-Going in State, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 19, 1997, at A4.
157 See Ed Anderson, Some Do, More Don't; ltl Catch On, Big Backer Says, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Aug. 17, 1998, at Al.
158 See UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH §§ 1644-
50, 1629 (1994).
159 See Bruce Nolan, Bishops Back Off Covenant Marriage, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct.
30, 1997 at AI; see also Anderson, supra note 157, at AI ("Episcopalians, Methodists and Presbyterians also
have not endorsed the new law. Baptists and more conservative denominations have.").
160 Whelan, supra note 147, at A14.
161 See Christine Pfeiffer, Editorial, Saving Marriages, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 15, 1998, at D3.
162 Heather Shulick, New Law Will Lock Women Into Abusive Marriages, Foes Say, TUCSON CITIZEN,
June 2, 1998, at IA; see also Stephen Dinan, House Mulls "'Covenant Marriage" Option, WASH. TIMES, Feb.
9, 1999, at C6 (quoting Virginia Poverty Law Center spokesperson); Jennifer Peter, House Votes Against
Proposal to Recognize Covenant Marriage; Proponents of the Legislation Say It Could Decrease the Number
of Divorces, VA.-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Feb. 11, 1999, at B4.
163 Diane Carman, Marriage BillAims to Blame, DENVER POST, Jan. 23, 1999, at BI.
164 See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. lOB (West 1998).
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six months.16 5 Arizona requires domicile for jurisdiction to obtain a divorce and
allows for a no-fault divorce upon a showing that the marriage is irretrievable."
Couples who have entered into covenant marriage may not take advantage of these
no-fault grounds because of their premarital agreement. However, the constitution-
ality of these statutes has not been tested. At issue is whether the fundamental right
to marry encompasses the right to divorce and if so, does a state have the right to
limit choices among petitioners.167 Even the agreement between the marrying part-
ners would not bar the constitutional claim and the debate will most likely center
on those who entered into the covenant marriage but are unable to afford a migra-
tory divorce from a nearby state.
A migratory divorce occurs when one party leaves his or her most current
domicile and establishes residency in another state with the sole purpose of obtain-
ing a divorce. 68 There are books describing the practice; Nelson Blake's The Road
to Reno: A History of Divorce in the United States (1962), is an example. Nevada is
most often identified as the state to which the migrating party goes seeking a quick
and lenient end to the marriage. 69 The practice caused one opinion from the New
York Court of Appeals to quip: "Nevada gets no closer to the real public concern
with the marriage than Chihuahua.' '170 Nevada does allow for divorce based on
minimum contact with the state,1 7' and if the petitioner meets the minimum time
necessary for jurisdiction, there is proper notice to the other party no matter in what
165 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 102 (West 1998).
166 See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25:312, 316 (West 1998).
167 See generally Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) ("By reaffirming the fundamental
character of the right to marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way
to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny."). See also P.O.P.S. v.
Gardner, 998 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1993); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (requiring the state to
provide a compelling state interest for denying a marriage license to persons of the same sex); Brian Bix,
Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About
Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 145 (1998); Melissa Lawton, Note, The Constitutionality of Covenant
Marriage Laws, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2471 (1998).
168 The practice results from two Supreme Court decisions holding that a state may alter the marital
status of any party domiciled in that state. And if that state had proper domicile according to its own statutory
basis, any other state must afford the divorce full faith and credit. See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams
1), 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
169 Oddly, Las Vegas, Nevada, celebrates more marriages than any other place in the world. In 1997,
there were 109,378 marriages in Las Vegas. See Jennifer Barrs, State of the Union; Americans Seek to Reduce
Divorce, TAMPA TRIB., June 15, 1998, at I (quoting the Clark County Recorder's Office).
170 Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1969) (quoting from Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209
N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1965), cert. denied., 384 U.S. 971 (1965)).
171 NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.020(1)(e) (1998) ("Divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be obtained
... [i]f plaintiff shall have resided six weeks in the state before suit was brought."). Note that the state's trial
court sits as a trier of fact as to whether plaintiff was physically present and had the intent to remain in the
state for an indefinite period of time. See Patel v. Patel, 604 P.2d 816 (Nev. 1980). Nonetheless, even an
omission by a petitioner of intent to remain in the state was "not necessarily fatal to jurisdiction with the
presence of the physical facts that evidenced such intention." Boisen v. Boisen, 451 P.2d 363, 364 (Nev.
1969).
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jurisdiction that party resides.172 If the ground for divorce is met, then the couple is
divorced and the divorce must be accorded full faith and credit in other states under
article IV, section 1 of the Constitution, but any state asked to accord full faith and
credit is afforded the opportunity to review the jurisdiction in the rendering state.'
73
If the jurisdiction requirements of the issuing state are met, no matter how slight
they may be, full faith and credit is due the divorce.
A couple entering into a covenant marriage in Louisiana or Arizona would
be bound by its limited accessibility to divorce in those states. But if one of the
parties has the resources to migrate to another state, establish proper jurisdiction
and file for divorce under a no-fault ground, the divorce, thus rendered, would be
entitled to full faith and credit in Louisiana or Arizona. Indeed, a party to a cove-
nant marriage would be able to obtain a divorce in a foreign country in like manner,
but such a divorce would not be entitled to full faith and credit, only comity.
174
While the covenant party may seek an injunction to prevent the other from leaving
the state to obtain a divorce in another jurisdiction, no court may interfere with a
right to travel and eventual dissolution of the marriage under a ground different
from that contemplated under the covenant agreement. A few states have enacted
statutory efforts to preclude residents from traveling to another state or foreign
country to obtain a divorce and then return to the original jurisdiction seeking full
faith and credit. One such statute is the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act,175 which
neither Louisiana nor Arizona has adopted. The statute sets forth parameters of
jurisdiction but would only be effective in barring fraudulent migratory divorces if
the states which have ordered the migratory divorces adopt it. Then it would restrict
the jurisdictional basis of their divorces, allowing for rejection of full faith and
credit. Thus, such statutes will only become effective if states with minimum juris-
diction requirements - Nevada, for example - adopt them.
If migratory divorce impedes the effectiveness of covenant marriage, mi-
172 Proper notice is essential. See In re Marconi, 584 N.W.2d 331, 334 (Iowa 1998).
173 See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
174 See, e.g., Carr v. Carr, 724 So. 2d 937, 940 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing for review of divorce
decree issued by the Dominican Republic in accordance with jurisdiction requirements, public policy of state,
and equities due the parties). See also Kazin v. Kazin, 405 A.2d 360, 367 (N.J. 1979) (petition to set aside the
foreign divorce must be prompt); Alabama v. Fulghum, 699 So.2d 980 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (prosecution
for bigamy when man married after obtaining invalid foreign divorce).
175 9 U.L.A. 26 (1999).
§ 1. Validity of Foreign Decree. A divorce from the bonds of matrimony obtained in an-
other jurisdiction shall be of no force or effect in this state, if both parties to the mar-
riage were domiciled in this state at the time the proceeding for the divorce was com-
menced.
§ 2. Evidence of Domicile. Proof that a person obtaining a divorce from the bonds of
matrimony in another jurisdiction was (a) domiciled in this state within twelve months
prior to the commencement of the proceeding therefor, and resumed residence in this
state within eighteen months after the date of his departure therefrom, or (b) at all times
after his departure from this state, and until his return maintained a place of residence
within this state, shall be prima facie evidence that the person was domiciled in this state
when the divorce proceeding was commenced.
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gratory marriage may become its legacy. At present the number of covenant mar-
riages performed in Louisiana is very small. 76 But if the practice became popular,
resulting in increased numbers of persons expected to participate in obtaining a
covenant marriage, couples resisting the social pressure would be encouraged to
exit the state to be married elsewhere. This occurred during the latter part of the
1980s when Louisiana imposed mandatory HIV testing for couples seeking mar-
riage licenses. 77 Illinois also imposed mandatory HIV testing requirements;
178
there was a resulting decrease in applications for marriage licenses in Illinois of 22
percentV79 In Cook County, where nearly half of the marriage licenses for the state
originate, the number of license applications dropped from 1,500 in the first three
weeks of January 1987 to 600 in the first three weeks of January 1988, whereas
applications increased in border states by 490 percent. 80
Covenant marriage is not mandatory in either Louisiana or Arizona, but if
it becomes the norm, which its sponsors hope it will, the social pressure may
prompt many of the citizens to leave the state so as to retain the right to no-fault
divorce and avoid the statutory expectations. Citizens wanting to reject the social
obligation of covenant marriage at the start may be forced into marriage in another
jurisdiction. Neither option seems beneficial to the state nor to its citizens. The best
assessment of covenant marriage may be this: "Covenant marriage is good public
relations but bad public policy.' '181 Providing couples with a means by which they
may force themselves into a protracted but not committed relationship is at best
misleading; at worst, misdirected. "Covenant marriage is not a new approach to the
problem; it is merely the ghost of a system that was declared dead three decades
ago. 182
B. Voluntary Marriage Preparation
While covenant marriage provides an option for a couple to make divorce
more difficult so as to allow for more time to work out difficulties, voluntary mar-
riage preparation seeks to prepare a couple before entering into marriage. The sug-
176 See McConnaughey, supra note 156, at A4.
177 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:241, 241(A) (West 1998). Texas also passed a statute mandating
HIV testing when HIV prevalence reached a designated point. See TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN. § 4419b (West
1987); II. Ann. Stat. Ch. 40, para. 204 (Smith-Hurd 1987).
178 See 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 204 (West 1987).
179 See Michael Closen et al., Mandatory Premarital HIV Testing: Political Exploitation of the AIDS
Epidemic, 69 TUL. L. REv. 71, 97 (1994).
ISO See id. at 97-98; see also Cheryl Devall, Repeal Marriage AIDS Test Law, Health Officials Urge,
CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 21, 1988, at 2 (stating that the total number of marriage license applications for January
1987 was 3,250 and dropped to 2,613 in January 1988).
181 Amy L. Stewart, Note, Covenant Marriage: Legislating Family Values, 32 IND. L. REv. 509, 536
(1999).
182 Id. at 535. See also Kristine M. Holmgren, Holy History Teaches a Simple Truth: You Can t Legis-
late Covenant, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis- St. Paul), Mar. 18, 1999, at 19A.
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gested reform effort is meant to address the complaints of domestic relations attor-
neys and sociologists, some of whom complain that returning to traditional fault
grounds for divorce is working on the wrong end of marriage. 183 Admittedly, en-
acted covenant marriage statutes have a provision requiring premarital counseling,
but the impetus of those statutes is elimination of no-fault as a basis for divorce.'
84
The intent behind voluntary marriage preparation is to better equip people for mar-
riage.
Any appraisal of marriage preparation begins with the premise that volun-
tary programs of premarital counseling have existed for extended periods. Barbara
Dafoe Whitehead describes at length the pioneer efforts of Earnest R. Groves to
combine traditional morality with human psychology so as to develop a more sci-
entific approach to marriage and marital problems. 185 Couples themselves are free
to go to counseling and seek advice and support from family and friends. Indeed,
arranged marriages, now more prevalent in the United States as a result of immigra-
tion, are a form of marriage preparation: the culture, religion and family of the cou-
ple have strong beliefs about the role of marriage, the role of the individuals and
the social obligations flowing from the status. Assuredly, these beliefs have been
taught from birth.
As with legislative efforts associated with covenant marriage, Protestant
evangelical pastors have been instrumental in developing new programs of mar-
riage counseling.1 86 Syndicated columnist Michael McManus and his wife advocate
a program called Community Covenant Marriage. 18 7 After they met with clergy in
Culpeper, Virginia, that city became the one hundredth in the country to adopt a
community marriage policy.'88 Cities in thirty-five states are participating in similar
programs.189 Being a part of the program does not require any state action, only that
183 See Laura Gatland, Putting the Blame on No-Fault, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 50 (quoting attorney
Lynne Gold-Bikin: "If you want marriages to work, you have to work before people make their choices"). In
connection with passage of the Florida Marriage Preparation and Preservation Act, the legislature found that,
"Parents who are separating or divorcing are more likely to receive maximum benefit from [programs] if they
attend such program[s] at the earliest stages of their dispute, before extensive litigation occurs and adversarial
positions are assumed or intensified." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.21 (1)(d) (West Supp. 1999).
Couples attending the counseling could pay a reduced marriage license application fee or be
allowed to waive the waiting period if one is imposed. See Suzanne McBride, Lawmakers Mull Proposals on
Marriage; Premarital Counseling, Covenant License Aimed at Keeping More Couples out of Divorce Court,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 10, 1998, at B1.
185 See WHITEHEAD, supra note 85, at 39-42.
186 See, e.g., Ervin Dyer, 18 Churches Join in Premarital Class Covenant, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, March 18, 1999, at Cl; Ben Steelman, Entering a Covenant; Many Pastors, Rabbis Offer Counsel-
ing, SUNDAY STAR-NEWS (Wilmington, N.C.), Jan. 31, 1999, at 14; Paula Story, 18 Churches' Leaders
Agree: No Counseling, No Wedding, SUNDAY PATRIOT-NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), March 21, 1999, at B6;
Katie Wang, Clergy Aim At Building Better Marriages; More Churches Want Couples to Have Counseling
Before They Say "I Do, " ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, March 7, 1999, at Al.
187 See Richard C. Dujardin, Churches Urged to Work Harder to Save Marriages, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
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churches participating require couples seeking to marry to undergo at least four
months of marriage preparation, which would include retreats and classes offered
by other married couples on how to build a successful marriage.190 The hope is that
couples would then turn to the advice they received or to other church programs
after marriage, to resolve conflicts and strengthen the relationship. 191
Secular advocates of better and more durable marriage also advocate mar-
riage preparation programs. Diane Sollee, head of the Coalition for Marriage, Fam-
ily and Couple Education in Washington, D.C., calls such programs "driver ed for-
marriage. ' 92 Lucy Kizirian, a marriage and family therapist identifies the particu-
lars: "[Couples] haven't been taught how to fight fair, how to get along with their
in-laws, how to manage a budget. Moreover... they don't understand that mar-
riages don't stay romantic forever."193 Abigail Stewart, one of five authors of Sepa-
rating Together: How Divorce Transforms Families, writes that society needs to
articulate what we expect from people when they get married.' 94 These persons and
others advocate a preparation program which can compete with messages received
from a culture which some see as promoting divorce. For example, Barbara Dafoe
Whitehead describes what she terms the "culture of divorce":
With each passing year, the culture of divorce becomes more
deeply entrenched. American children are routinely schooled in
divorce . . . Family movies and videos for children feature di-
vorced families. Mrs. Doubtfire, originally a children's book
about divorce and then a hit movie, is aggressively marketed as a
holiday video for kids. Of course, these books and movies are de-
signed to help children deal with the social reality and psychologi-
cal trauma of divorce. But they also carry an unmistakable mes-
sage about the impermanence and unreliability of family bonds.
Like romantic love, the children's storybooks say, family love
comes and goes. Daddies disappear. Mommies find new boy-
friends. Mommies' boyfriends leave. Grandparents go away. Even
pets must be left behind.195
Even though the impetus for the program of voluntary marriage prepara-
tion came from religiously motivated persons, the responsibility has spread to civic
and political leaders. Discussion usually begins with the merits of covenant mar-
riage and progresses to covenant programs. Legislation to enact covenant marriage
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 See States Ponder Ways to Fortify Matrimony; Proposals Have Included "Drivers Ed"for Mar-
riage, Repeal of No-Fault Divorce, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 14, 1999, at 4A.
193 Barrs, supra note 169, at 1.
194 See id.
195 WHITEHEAD, supra note 85, at 11.
1999]
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
was introduced in seventeen states in 1998, and Pam Greenberg from the National
Conference of State Legislatures said that other bills have been introduced to pro-
vide for counseling prior to marriage or divorce, parenting education, and repeal of
no-fault divorce.196 In Grand Rapids, Michigan, a steering committee composed of
college presidents, attorneys, business owners, clerics, a local mayor, and a judge
initiated a community covenant program which included the following: (1) encour-
age a courtship for at least a year; (2) promote chastity outside of marriage and
fidelity in the marital relationship; (3) train mature married couples to serve as
mentors to those who are engaged, newlyweds or experiencing marital difficulties;
(4) cooperate with other congregations and organizations to share resources and to
create a positive climate in which all marriages are helped to succeed; (5) examine
within professions ways current policies and practices may unwittingly undermine
marriage; (6) promote a workplace environment which will effectively support
marriages and families, and (7) volunteer time, expertise, influence and resources to
support initiatives which promote marriage and stable families.197
Statistics indicate that communities which provide community covenant
programs to couples experience a reduction in divorce. 98 The chairperson of the
Wisconsin group, Eau Claire, reported that divorce filings dropped from 398 in
1995 to 366 in 1996 and 341 in 1997.199 Michael McManus, the originator of the
program, reports that the divorce rate in Modesto, California, the first of the cove-
nant cities, has since 1986 witnessed a drop of thirty-five percent in the number of
divorces.200 Other cities have seen declines of between five and fifteen percent.0 1
The reason for the decline could be a result of many factors, but any shift in attitude
is an incentive for members of the community covenant program.
This shift in attitude is a major one. Commenting on the past gradual de-
cline of efforts to strengthen marriages, Barbara Dafoe Whitehead writes: "[T]he
effort to strengthen and preserve marriage has been all but abandoned in recent
years, either as a commitment by parents unhappy in their marriages or as a goal for
family professionals. 20 2 While noting the lack of professional opportunities for
persons to learn or develop skills for preserving marriage relationships, the ques-
tion arises as to whether such programs have any effect. At first glance, the answer
196 See Otto, supra note 150, at A9.
197 See Roger Sider, Commentary, Civic Commitment to Sustain the Vows, WASH. TIMES, July 8,
1998, at A16.
198 See Susan Wetzel, Marriage Preparation is a Worthy Goal, GREENSBORO NEWS AND REC., Aug.
22, 1998, at B6.
199 See Tom Heinen, Fond du Lac Clergy Join Movement for Marriage Guidelines; Community
Covenant to Cut Divorce Rate Signed by 20 Church Leaders, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 19, 1998, at 1.
200 See id.
201 See David Waters, Dyer Clergy Commit to Make "Till Death Do You Part" Reality, COMM.
APPEAL (Memphis), Sept. 28, 1998, at Al.
202 WHITEHEAD, supra note 85, at 190. See also Sayers et al., supra note 82, at 713 (reporting that
programs have begun in earnest only in the last two decades). See generally PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE
AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA (D. Popenoe et al. eds., 1996).
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would appear negative as the number of Roman Catholics divorcing is similar to
the rest of the population. The Catholic church has long required each couple enter-
ing into marriage to attend some sort of program or counseling session prior to
marriage. This may be a one-day session conducted by a priest or trained married
couples, or an engaged encounter weekend where the couple is expected to focus
on an inventory of issues such as finances, communications, religion and inti-
macy.0 3 In addition, there are extensive inventory tests which the priest may ad-
minister to the couple, then discuss the results.20 4 There is also the dogma of the
faith which teaches that marriage is a sacrament, 20 5 and this reinforcement is con-
stant in church attendance. However, sponsors claim the program is far too short
and societal pressures too ingrained to be positively affected by church programs.
Even if sheer numbers do not ratify the effectiveness of premarital
counseling, there is sufficient evidence of what programs and models seem to have
the best effect. Recent articles on the subject report that: "Marriage-education
professionals have made progress over the past two decades in understanding the
needs of premarital couples and addressing those needs more effectively."2 6
Interactive programs are recommended, and structured discussion in small groups
"appears to promote enhanced awareness, communication skills, and mutual
support among couples involved.,,20 7 The emphasis should be upon skills: financial
management, gender roles, leisure, sex, parenting, communications or conflict
resolution.08 Yet any study offering an appraisal of premarital programs must
begin with the fact that those most likely to voluntarily participate are those "who
are probably better adjusted to begin with. '2 9 Researchers indicate that an effort
must be made to include those at greater risk: "those from lower income homes,
with adverse family climates, with lower levels of religiosity, with less optimism
about marriage, who are younger in age and possibly emotional maturity, and who
may not report that preparation for marriage is all that important."
210
Having noted progress among professionals in developing programs to ad-
dress skills associated with better relationships, studies are guarded in assessing
203 See Steelman, supra note 186, at 14; Wang, supra note 186, at Al. A rejected Wisconsin proposal
would have allowed the county to notify clergy who married the couple when the county received a petition
for divorce. The supposition being that the cleric could intervene to save the marriage. See Lori Holly, County
to Give Couples Marriage Tips; Those Who Obtain Licenses Will Get Pamphlet as Part of Effort to Reduce
Divorce Rate, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 29, 1999, at 1.
204 See Steelman, supra note 186, at 14.
205 See id.
206 Benjamin Silliman & Walter R. Schumm, Improving Practice in Marriage Preparation, 25 J. SEx
& MARITAL THERAPY 23, 38 (1999).
207 Id. at 29.
208 See id. at 36.
209 Benjamin Silliman & Walter R. Schumm, Client Interests in Premarital Counseling: A Further
Analysis, 21 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 43, 53 (1995).
210 Id
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any progress made in preventing marital discord. For example, "[O]n the more
important issue of demonstrating that preventive interventions can help maintain
relationship adjustment and enhance stability, the evidence remains quite weak."2z
Researchers at the University of Califomia, Los Angeles, report the findings of two
studies indicating that, "even couples who are most likely to benefit from [premari-
tal] programs may not actually experience better marital outcomes. 212 But then
again, they may: "it is quite likely that some of the couples in these studies partici-
pated in highly effective premarital programs. 21 3 Consistently, the conclusion is
that present studies were limited and more data, more participation and more pro-
gram models need to be developed.21 4
Churches and other religious congregations occupy a pivotal role in mar-
riage preparation. "A much higher percentage of couples may be reached with this
approach, and there is potential for standardizing interventions in these settings and
for collecting follow-up data to evaluate the impact of their prevention pro-
grams. 215 If the delivery of marriage preparation programs were broadened to take
advantage of the programs offered by churches, important insights would be gained
to assist couples. 16 The means by which this would be broadened would be to re-
quire couples to undergo marriage preparation prior to obtaining a marriage license.
The state may offer secular preparation, but the churches would have the opportu-
nity to evangelize in consort with the free exercise rights of the couple. Further-
more, data compiled by the state on divorce could be made available to the reli-
gious denominations as feedback. The interaction between the presently voluntary
programs being conducted by many private organizations would work well in tan-
dem with public policy considerations and resources. With this goal in mind, on
January 1, 1999, Florida began a comprehensive program of mandatory marriage
preparation.
C. Florida: Mandatory Marriage Preparation
Florida was the first state in the nation to enact a comprehensive plan for
strengthening marital relationships. The statute became effective in 1999 and is
known as the Marriage Preparation and Preservation Act of 1998.217 Among the
211 Sayers et al., supra note 82, at 739.
212 Kieran T. Sullivan & Thomas N. Bradbury, Are Premarital Prevention Programs Reaching Cou-
ples at Riskfor Marital Dysfunction?, 65 J. CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 24,29 (1997).
213 ld.
214 See id.
215 Id. at 29-30.
216 See Sayers et al., supra note 82, at 739-40.
217 1998 Fla. Sess Law Serv. 98-403 (West) (codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT. ANN. (West
Supp. 1999)). Monetary support for the provisions of the act will come from fees associated with issuance of
a marriage license for those not taking the premarital preparation course, and from any fees associated with
filing for divorce. The fees will be placed in the Family Courts Trust Fund. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
741.01(4), 28.101(1)(d)1 & 2 (West Supp. 1999). Also, $75,000 was appropriated to the Florida State Uni-
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things the statute does not do is alter the no-fault divorce regime in Florida, nor
does it enact a covenant marriage option for state citizens. Divorce remains an op-
tion as before: Upon a finding of six months residency to establish jurisdiction, a
couple may file for a divorce based on irretrievable breakdown, and if there are
children, the court may order counseling or continue the proceeding for another
three months to enable the parties to seek reconciliation. 218 Other procedures are
now in place which would assist, but the parties still have the ability to enter into
marriage with minimal differences from prior to the act.
Publicity surrounding the act implied that getting a divorce was too easy.
Commentators compared the hassle of getting a driver's license with the ease with
which one could get a divorce. 9 Statistics exceeded the nationwide pattern of fifty
percent of marriages ending in divorce: 149,941 Floridians got married in 1996;
80,218 got divorced.220 There is also a growing movement among state citizens
towards voluntary marriage preparation and support and giving couples time to
work out their difficulties. This is the complaint over no-fault divorce: it allows no
time for the couple to settle disputes between themselves. The emphasis in the new
Florida legislation is upon learning relationship skills and then applying them to the
workplace, schools, neighborhoods and to better marriages. The statute proclaims
that "[t]he state has a compelling interest in educating its citizens with regard to
marriage and, if contemplated, the effects of divorce. '221
Specific elements of the education program include the following: First,
students in high school will be required to take a course in marriage and relation-
ship skills. Starting at the high school level adopts the thinking of persons such as
Dianne Sollee, leader of the Coalition for Marriage, Family and Couples Education,
that marriage is skill-based and "any fool can learn." This is the premise of the
marriage preparation programs as well. Florida intends to begin the process earlier,
at high school.
Second, the fee charged for each marriage license issued in the state will
be reduced by a sum of $32.50 for all couples who obtain a certificate of attendance
from a qualified course provider for a course taken no more than one year prior to
the date of the application for a marriage license.223 The course must be at least four
versity Center for Marriage and Family "for review of premarital preparation courses, development of pre-
marital preparation pilot programs, and development of a questionnaire and creation of a curriculum based on
data collected by its researchers."1998 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 98-403, § 16.
218 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.021, 61.052 (West Supp. 1999). Florida does not grant divorce based
upon fault of either of the parties.
219 See, e.g., Barrs, supra note 169, at 1.
220 See id.
221 1998 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 98-403, § 2(9). Legislation has been introduced in California seeking to
educate couples about the responsibilities of marriage. See Think First, Then Wed, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1999,
atB6.
222 Cheryl Wetzstein, Marriage Helps Jobs, Families, Panel Says, WASH. TIMES, July 2, 1998, at
AI0.
223 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.0 1(5) (west Supp. 1999).
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hours and may be completed by personal instruction, videotape, instruction via
other electronic medium, or a combination of these methods. z4 The topics may
include conflict management, communication skills, financial responsibilities, par-
enting responsibilities and analysis of personal data pertinent to the couple being
married.225 Course providers may come from a list of professional persons, includ-
ing psychologists, clinical social workers, marriage and family therapists, mental
health counselors, and officials of a recognized religious institution.226 Course pro-
viders must register with the clerk of the circuit court and obtain a license number,
or, if a member of a religious organization, a statement as to relevant training. z7
The cost of the premarital program will be paid by the parties themselves, z8 so any
reduction in the fee paid to obtain a marriage license will be offset by the cost of
the course.
Third, all premarital preparation courses offered and completed by indi-
viduals will be reviewed by researchers from the Florida State University Center
for Marriage and Family. 229 An effort will be made to determine which programs
and techniques work best, and pilot programs will be developed based on the re-
sults. 230 Because the state will have access to divorce data which take place in Flor-
ida, statistics and observations can be obtained as to the effectiveness of prepara-
tion programs.
Fourth, the state requests the Family Law Section of the Florida Bar to cre-
ate a handbook which would explain the rights and responsibilities under Florida
law of marital partners to each other and to their children, both during marriage and
upon dissolution.231 When a couple applies for a marriage license, the handbook
would be provided.232 Within the handbook would be information concerning pre-
nuptial agreements, shared parental responsibility for children, child support, prop-
erty rights, domestic violence and abuse of children, and community resources
available for separating or divorcing persons and their children.233 Women's rights
will be specified in the Battered Women's Bill of Rights.234 The clerk may also
make the information available on videotape or other electronic media and will
provide a list of providers and sites at which marriage preparation courses can be
224 See id. § 741.0305(l).
225 See id. § 741.0305(2).
226 See id. § 741.0305(3)(a).
227 See id. § 741.0305(5).
228 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.0305(3)(b).
229 See id. § 741.03055(1).
230 See id. § 741.03055(2).
231 See id. § 741.0306(1).
232 See id. § 741.0306(2).
233 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.0306(3).
234 See id. § 741.0306(3)(k).
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obtained.s
Fifth, before a marriage license may be issued to a couple wishing to
marry, the couple must first sign a statement which specifies whether the parties,
separately or together, have completed a premarital preparation course.236 The
statement must also specify whether the couple has obtained and read or otherwise
accessed the information obtained in the family law handbook or other electronic
media presentation. 37 As an incentive for the couple to complete the premarital
preparation course, the effective date of the marriage license will not be delayed if
the couple has completed the course; if the course is not completed, the couple
must wait three days before the marriage license will be effective.238
Sixth, the Florida State University Center for Marriage and Family may
prepare a questionnaire for distribution to all prospective married couples. Any
applicant for marriage may complete and file with the clerk of the circuit court an
unsigned anonymous informational questionnaire. 239 Responses will be kept in a
separate file and used for research. 240 Likewise, whenever a couple files for divorce
or dissolution of their marriage, the Florida State University Center for Marriage
and Family will provide a questionnaire to be completed by the couple.241 In this
instance, however, completion of the questionnaire is not voluntary, the petitioner
must complete the questionnaire and the responses will then be kept in a separate
file and made available for research.242
Finally, when a couple has filed for divorce and there is proper jurisdic-
tion, the court may grant the divorce on the statutory no-fault ground.243 If there are
no minor children, the divorce may be granted upon the court's finding that the
marriage is, in fact, irretrievably broken.2" However, if there are minor children of
the marriage, the court may order the couple to consult with a marriage counselor,
psychologist, psychiatrist, minister, priest, rabbi, or any other person deemed quali-
fied by the court and acceptable to the party or parties ordered to seek consulta-
235 See id. § 741.0306(2).
236 See id. § 741.04(2)(a).
237 See id. § 741.04(2)(b).
238 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04(3). The statute does allow exceptions to the three-day period of
delay before marriage may be effective. These exceptions will be granted to non-Florida residents seeking a
marriage license from the state and for individuals asserting hardship. Marriage license fee waivers will
continue to be available to all eligible individuals and for state residents. A county court judge may waive the
delayed date for good cause. See id
239 See id. § 741.03056(1).
240 See id.
241 See id. § 61.043(2).
242 See id.
243 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052(2).
244 See id. § 61.052(2)(a).
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tion.2 45 The process of consultation may continue the marriage no longer than three
months, and if at any time during the consultation process the court finds that the
marriage is irretrievably broken, the court may grant the petition for the divorce.24
Furthermore, when there are minor children, courts may mandate participation in
the Parent Education and Family Stabilization Course, a program designed to edu-
cate, train, and assist divorcing parents in regards to the consequences of divorce on
parents and children.247 For good cause, a court may excuse a party from attending,
and the court will establish a registry of course providers and sites at which the
Parent Education and Family Stabilization Course requirement may be com-
pleted. 248 And even though a fee may be required to attend, the court may provide
at least one site where the fee will be on a sliding scale for those unable to pay.249
Statements made or information obtained at the sessions may not be used in con-
junction with any pending adjudication or become part of the record of the case.25°
Also, the couple need not take the course together.251 And for enforcement, the
court may deny parental responsibility or visitation or hold both or either of the
parties in contempt for failure to take the course.252
The Florida legislation is important because the state seeks to set manda-
tory standards for marriage and divorce that go beyond assumptions complement-
ing marriage formalities and divorce grounds. Formalities and grounds have long
been associated with the state's ability to set the rules of marriage.253 But following
the period of expanded individual liberties during the 1960s and 1970s, the state
responded to the individuality of the contracts between the parties and eschewed
rules and domination. No-fault divorce resulted. The pattern once set, "[I]f the state
is now in the process of divesting itself of its marriage regulation business, then, of
course, it is not likely to set up shop as an enforcer to heretofore unenforceable
contracts.,,254 Today, Florida's new legislation is the first major step by a state to
reestablish marriage regulations. Seen either as societal justification or as societal
tyranny, the step is significant because the state is challenging the individual liberty
245 See id. § 61.052(2)(b)(1).
246 See id. § 61.052(2)(b)(2).
247 See id. § 61.21(2).
248 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.21(3), (6).
249 See id. § 61.21(6).
250 See id. § 61.21(8).
251 See id. § 61.21(10).
252 See id. § 61.21(9).
253 See generally, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190
(1888); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985). But see Lenore Weitzman, Legal Regulation
of Marriage: Tradition and Change, A Proposalfor Individual Contracts and Contracts in Lieu of Marriage,
62 CAL. L. REv. 1169 (1974) (asserting that individual needs replace the needs of the state to regulate mar-
riage).
254 Glendon, supra note 47, at 666.
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of the couple in making its own rules in regards to marriage. This is significant
because it reverses a well-established trend.
The Florida legislation is a move towards greater state involvement in the
individual lives of married partners, albeit at the behest of concern for child welfare
and sometimes, the couple's own well-being. It goes beyond distributing pamphlets
~ ,*255to couples who obtain a marriage license, or allowing couples to privately adopt
a covenant marriage. It does not raise the requirements to enter into marriage.256
Instead, it mandates programs which the state thinks important to a functioning
relationship. The state is asserting itself as a player in the status of marriage.
Other states, such as Indiana, are considering adoption of the Florida legis-
lation. In Indiana, however, lawmakers are considering making the features which
Florida allows as discretionary to become mandatory. For example, requiring that
all couples complete a marriage preparation or counseling program.257 Florida only
provides a modest financial incentive. If legislatures in the seventeen states which
considered passing covenant marriage during 1998 terms review the possibility of
Florida's example, further debate and possible legislation will follow. The extent to
which the state becomes involved in marriage preparation will, at a minimum, af-
fect consensus as to the definition of family and a reawakening of marriage. The
state's return to an objective standard of marriage, particularly one which may be
influenced by religious preparation will lessen the individuality of the marriage
contract and reawaken the objective distinctiveness of marriage.
Steven Nock, a sociologist at the University of Virginia, thinks that
"[s]ome type of divorce reform will probably exist in almost every state in the next
10 to 15 years."256 There is a growing concern over the number of divorces among
more conservative persons who seek to restore a sense of family and commitment.
As one author has written: "The idealized family has become the panacea for all
social ills in contemporary policy discussions., 25 9 The resulting debate prompts
popular slogans and rhetoric which then become legislative initiatives. One of the
primary incentives, according to Nock, is the state welfare costs associated with
divorce. Nock estimates that, "for every three or four divorces, one family ends up
255 See Holly, supra note 203, at 1.
256 Maryland, for example, in response to a marriage between a pregnant 13-year-old girl and a 29-
year-old man, raised the minimum age of marriage during its 1999 legislative session. See 1999 Md. Laws
231 (amending MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 2-301); Tanya Jones, Miller Seeks Sex Charges in Marriage of
Girl, 13; Calling 29 Year-Old Man A Predator, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 3, 1998, at 2B.
257 See Suzanne McBride, Proposal Would Urge Couples to Look Before Leaping, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Aug. 13, 1998, at Al; see generally ScoTr STANLEY & HOWARD MARKMAN, CAN GOVERNMENT
RESCUE MARRIAGES? (1997) (arguing that there are negative effects of having government involved in pro-
moting values and private lives).
258 Otto, supra note 150, at A9.
259 Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2181, 2195 (1995). The author argues that the traditional definition of family must be less form oriented
and more developmental in the context of function. At present, the form definition forces women into
subservient roles, deprives them of financial resources, and subjects them to stigma. The sooner society
adjusts to the changing definition of family, the better will be public policy response. See id. at 2184-86.
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on welfare., 260 Even with child support collections up from $12 billion in 1996 to
$14.4 billion in 1998,261 children are often the financial victims of divorce. Adults
too are victims of the economic costs associated with divorce.
When Congress passed the Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), states were given block grants with which
they could wean welfare recipients from welfare to work. The new rules allow for
child care, housing grants, transportation grants and housing vouchers. But the fed-
eral legislation also impacts the definition of family and family responsibility. Ad-
ditionally, because the grants are not open-ended entitlements, states are confronted
with a finite amount of dollars and the need to make people responsible for each
other. States have been very successful in reducing the number of welfare recipi-
ents from their roles and indications are that many of the former welfare recipients
are employed. 262 The Florida legislation works tangentially with the new federal
legislation. That is, if states are called upon to support increasing numbers of chil-
dren who are the victims of poverty because of a hasty marriage or divorce, atten-
tion to greater education as to the responsibilities of marriage will follow. A suc-
cessful marriage lessens the chances of a child and adult being poor. Poverty
prompts state support of marriage preparation. In doing so however, the state is
working in tandem with the new federal welfare legislation to define family as a
form family constituted by marriage. Choosing the definition of family is signifi-
cant.
IV. REAWAKENING: PRWORA AND THE DEFINITION OF FAMILY
Poverty is an elusive concept to define. Nonetheless, virtually all of the
commentators on the subject of divorce and poverty agree that the chances for a
child to be at or below the poverty level are greatly enhanced if the parents divorce
and the child remains in a single parent household.263 Furthermore, women who
divorce and do not remarry are far more likely to be poor than men who divorce.264
Marriage allows for combined income, a reduction in income production loss pos-
sibilities, and a mediation of any gender bias.26 The trend towards this unity of
earning power is evidenced in the statistics: in 1990, in approximately 70 percent of
260 Otto, supra note 150, at A9.
261 See Havemann, supra note 17, at A27.
262 See Al Kamen, Clinton Touts Decline in Welfare Rolls, New Rules for States, WASH. POST, Apr.
11, 1999, atA7.
263 See BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, at 83.
264 See Lynne M. Casper et al., The Gender-Poverty Gap: What We Can Learn From Other Coun-
tries, 59 AM. Soc. REV. 594, 598 (1994) (reporting that recent studies indicate that American women are
forty-one percent more likely to live in poverty than American men).
265 See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); SUSAN MOLLER ORKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989).
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two-parent families with children, both parents worked." Thus, if divorce creates a
class of persons with a significant chance of falling below the poverty level, then
divorce prevention becomes a compelling state interest.267 This is the rationale be-
hind covenant marriage, initiatives to curtail no-fault divorce, and Florida's Mar-
riage Preparation and Preservation Act.
If the state has a compelling state interest to curtail poverty through pre-
serving marriage, does the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) contribute to the urgency of the
task? The answer will depend on the effect which the Act has upon the ability of
any newly divorced woman to support herself and her children. Obviously, a
woman with adequate resources, either because of economic self-sufficiency or full
and fair support payments will not be affected by the Act's provisions. But women
without such resources are at risk.268 They are at risk because the Act will terminate
support payments unless they can achieve self-sufficiency through employment.
While the Act creates substantial mechanisms for collection of child support, em-
ployment for the custodial parent is the crucial factor." 9 If employment opportuni-
ties are absent and children are involved, the increased possibility of poverty will
generate an additional incentive for states to preserve marriage and discourage di-
vorce. But the important connection is the state's support for the definition of fam-
ily constituted by marriage and the support it is willing to provide. If the single
woman with children does not include herself in this definition then the state's sup-
port lessens and eventually evaporates. This is the crucial shift from past welfare
support through AFDC payments.
266 See TERRY LUGAILA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND
CHILDREN: A 30-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 42 (1992). In 27.5 percent of the families, both parents worked fill-
time; in 30 percent, the husband worked full-time, the wife less than year-round full-time; in 21 percent, the
wife worked only in the home; and in 21 percent the husband worked less than full-time. See id. at 43.
267 There are those who would argue that the state should provide greater amounts of public benefits
to women, in part because the raising of children is a public benefit and women should be provided with
resources to allow for that benefit, whether they live in a marriage relationship or not. See, e.g., Fineman,
supra note 259, at 2214 ("The approach in this country must change and those women who are caretakers
must be given a right to resources to enable them to perform the tasks we demand of them.").
268 See Linda D. Elrod, Child Support Reassessed: Federalization of Enforcement Nears Completion,
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 695 n.14 (1997) (citing SCOON-ROGERS & LESTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
CHILD SUPPORT FOR CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS (1991) ("In
1991, 46 percent of the 11.5 million custodial parents potentially eligible for child support did not have an
award. Another I 1 percent has an award, but actually received nothing. Six and a half million families re-
ceived no payment at all.")).
269 The Act provides six provisions for the collections of child support: (1) New hire reporting within
20 days; (2) mandatory state adoption of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act; (3) access to all gov-
emnment information, including military files; (4) access to private information related to public utilities, cable
television, banks and credit agencies; (5) matching lists of obligors with lists of assets and creation of state
registries of support obligations; and (6) expedited procedures which emphasizes administrative initiative to
impose liens, seize funds, suspend licenses, and issue subpoenas. See Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, §§ 313, 316 (codified at scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See generally Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy:
Implications of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, 30 FAM. L. Q. 519 (1996).
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The PRWORA became effective on July 1, 1997.27o The purpose of the
legislation was to eliminate Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC)
entitlements and replace them with block welfare grants to the states, thus ending a
system of welfare which had been in existence for sixty-one years.271 More pre-
cisely, it ended a system of welfare which had provided a federal, cash-based safety
net for children, and replaced it with a program which contains the following major
provisions:
(1) Imposition of a five-year limit on benefits, although as many
as twenty percent of families may be allowed exceptions in hard-
ship situations.
(2) One person in every family must be working within two years
after receiving welfare or lose benefits. States must have at least
one-half of their single-parent welfare recipients working by 2002.
(3) Elimination, except for some emergency situations, of all fed-
eral public benefits for certain aliens such as illegal immigrants
and non-immigrants, and students, during their first five years in
the United States.
(4) Creation of broad cash welfare and child care block grants to
states, allowing them to reform welfare in ways that are appropri-
ate to the individual states, and move families into jobs. 2
The provisions of the Act complement the implied expectations of its
drafters: (1) to put an end to welfare dependency, especially welfare mothers;273 (2)
to stop subsidizing illegitimacy; (3) to introduce the independence of employment -
an "opportunity society" - into the lives of parents and their children; (4) to force
states into accountability for dollars spent and programs initiated; (5) to revitalize
the role of private institutions serving as social welfare nets for the poor; and (6), to
save the federal government money. Estimates are that the "new law would save
the federal government $54.1 billion over six years, although most of the savings
come not from the ending of AFDC, but rather from other provisions of the welfare
270 See Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 § 116.
271 See MASSARO, SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 20, at ix.
272 Id.; Foreword to The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
273 See generally William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92
YALE L. J. 1198 (1983); Isabel Wilkerson, An Intimate Look at Welfare: Women Wholve Been There, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1995, atAl.
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bill .... ,274 Drafters had as a goal the phrase that President Clinton used repeatedly
during his 1992 campaign: to end welfare as we know it.275 This goal was a key
feature of the House Republican Contract with America, and culminated decades of
debate over how best to strengthen a process of support for children which had
begun with the New Deal. 6
Much has been written about the future consequences of the new welfare
law. It has been asserted that block grants to the states will disproportionately harm
certain segments of the population which have traditionally suffered from the lack
of uniformity in program standards. 7 Others complain about "soft time limits"
which allow for states to apply to reduce time limits of entitlement or expand them
when there is hardship. 8 Others argue that time limits ought not to be used at all,
but instead there should be programs which would ease people into the work-
force.27 9 The work requirements, the major element of the welfare legislation, have
evoked most comments because of past efforts to place welfare recipients in jobs.
The federal legislation allows states to develop work requirement pro-
grams as they deem proper but already there are complaints. For example, "Mil-
lions of dollars in federal welfare-to-work funds have been funneled to California
for job training programs, but much of it remains unused, mired in governmental
red tape and shifting priorities.,,280 Few specifics are available, but 'a series of
conditions involving the work requirements must be met before a state may receive
its grant from the federal government. Thomas Massaro describes what is
necessary:
First, to avoid penalties such as the forfeiture of part of their block
grant, the states must enforce minimum work participation rates
for their welfare caseloads. The annual participation rate starts
with an initial 25 percent in 1997 and rises by increments to 50
percent in 2002. Second, the law lists twelve categories of activi-
274 MASSARO, SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 20, at ix.
275 Drafters of the new legislation were led by House Speaker Newt Gingrich. A summary of his
plans may be found in his book, NEwT GINGRICH, To RENEW AMERICA at ch. 2 (1995). In addition, see
generally RESTORING THE DREAM: THE BOLD NEW PLAN BY HOUSE REPUBLICANS (Stephen Moore ed.,
1995).
276 Major contributors to the thinking which brought about welfare reform are: Charles Murray, who
has written both In Pursuit of Happiness & Good Government (1988) and Losing Ground: American Social
Policy 1950-1980 (1984); Lawrence M. Mead, who has written The New Politics of Poverty: The Nonworking
Poor in America (1992) as well as Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship (1986); and
George Gilder, who wrote End to Welfare Reform as We Know It, The American Spectator, June 1995, at 24.
277 See KATHERINE MCFATE, MAKING WELFARE WORK: THE PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTIVE
WELFARE REFORM 33 (1995); Margaret Weir, Urban Poverty and Defensive Localism, DISSENT, Summer
1994, at 338-41.
278 The term is appropriate to a project of the govemor of Michigan called "Project Zero." See Jason
DeParle, Aidfrom an Enemy of the Welfare State, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1996, at D4.
279 See Report and Recommendations on H.R. 4, 'The Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, "50 REC.
ASSOC. OF BAR OF CITY OF NEW YORK 493-521 (1995).
280 Carla Rivera, Welfare-to-Work Effort Awash in Unused Funds, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1999, at A1.
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ties in which recipients may engage in order to be counted toward
their state's work participation rate. Included are an "upper track"
of seven categories of direct engagement in work (in the private or
public sectors, including community service and subsidized on-
the-job training) and a "lower track" of work preparation activities
(attending secondary school, vocational educational programs, and
job skills training). No more than 20 percent of a state's recipients
may count toward its work participation rate through this second
category of work activities. Third, the law sets a minimum number
of hours per week for participation in these activities in order for
recipients to count toward the state's work percentage goals. This
requirement starts at twenty hours for single parents and rises in
stages to thirty hours after 2000.281
Requiring welfare recipients to work is the capstone of the new legislation;
work is the solution to welfare dependency. But of course this presupposes that
work will be available and work will lead to self-sufficiency. The premise of the
work solution has provoked the most controversy. Indeed, even before the new
welfare legislation was passed, angry remarks were directed towards those who
would make accusations "at the most defenseless people in our society [to] stigma-
tize and dehumanize them. 282 For Professor Martha Fineman, work requirements
distort the problem and allows proponents of change to make false and misleading
accusations about those people - mostly women - who receive welfare. Thus,
The essence of the so-called "welfare trap" is not that welfare
warps women's personalities or makes them pathologically de-
pendent, though that may occasionally happen. The essence of the
"trap" is that while welfare pays badly, low-pay jobs pay even
worse. Most welfare mothers are quite willing to work if they end
up with significantly more disposable income as a result. But they
are not willing to work if working will leave them as poor as they
were when they stayed home.283
State and federal legislators will see little merit in the unwillingness of
281 MASSARO, SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 20, at 102. To date, the state of Maryland has been the
most successful in eliminating welfare recipients from its rolls. See Kamen, supra note 262, at A7 ("The state
registered a 55 percent drop since 1993, going from 221,338 recipients to 99,852.").
282 Fineman, supra note 259, at 2193. See also MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF
WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1988); NANCY FRASER,
UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY (1989).
283 Fineman, supra note 259, at 2193 n.32 (quoting from Christopher Jencks & Kathryn Edin, The
Real Welfare Problem, 1 AM. PROSPECT 31, 43-44 (1990). See also LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT
ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994); Iris Marion Young, Making
Single Motherhood Normal, DISSENT, 1994, at 88.
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welfare recipients to work in low paying jobs; the solution would be for them to
progress to better pay and more responsibility. This is the promise of American
individualism and a distinctive philosophy of economic liberalism.8 4 But the fact
of the matter is that there are cogent arguments to support the argument that there
are particular "environmental factors which block [employment] opportunity for
residents of inner-city America."285 And if these factors prevent welfare recipients
from working the new welfare legislation eliminates subsistence. The government
policy has made a decision about entitlement, but it has also made a decision about
the definition of family and Who deserves support in providing public service. This
is the argument made by Professor Fineman. 8
The clash between Professor Fineman's approach and that of the new wel-
fare legislation is over the merit of paying adults, mostly women, to stay home and
raise children. Most of these children would be non-marital, contributing to what
welfare legislation sponsors termed the "promiscuity entitlement., 287 And since the
vast majority of these children will be borne into poverty,288 the rationale is to re-
duce welfare payments and thus reduce the incentive for women to have children
without two parents actually committed to their financial support. Family welfare
caps and other measures making it less advantageous for women to give birth with-
out the ability to support the child is now the responsibility of the states. Programs
which the states adopt to increase work and to decrease the number of non-marital
children will continue a policy and an American consensus as to what constitutes a
traditional family, what is deserving of government economic support, and what
constitutes value. The fact that the state forces these women into a family structure
of two-parents in a marital relationship goes to the essence of Professor Fineman's
argument. She argues that having children is per se worthwhile and entitles the
mother who raises that child to state support.289 Having the child outside of mar-
riage is not promiscuous. In defining it as such, the state is forcing a woman to
choose a medium of family structure based on religious tradition and common us-
age; it deprives the single mother of worth because it strips her of her individuality.
284 For a discussion of welfare and its conflict with American ideals, see MASSARO, SOCIAL
TEACHING, supra note 20, at 64-67. See generally BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN
INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL DEBATE (1994).
285 MASSARO, SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 20, at 212. See generally NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND
THE U.S. ECONOMY (1986) [hereinafter ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL]; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE
WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996).
286 "The institution of marriage is seriously offered as the uniquely appropriate form for social policy,
and systems of proposed disincentives to keep unmarried women from reproducing are debated by a multi-
plicity of predominantly male politicians in various halls of power." Fineman, supra note 259, at 2195.
287 Gilder, supra note 276, at 26 (1995).
288 See BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, at 19 ("In 1960 only 5 percent of all births in the United
States were to unmarried mothers; in 1988 more than 25 percent were. Today, more than a million babies
each year are born to unmarried women."). "Among children living with only their mothers, sustained pov-
erty for seven or more years is common; among children living with both parents it is rare." Id at 83.
289 See Fineman, supra note 259, at 2211.
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It deprives her of state-sponsored support in her decision to raise a child alone.290
There are other critics of the new welfare legislation. They argue that work
requirements, restrictions on non-marital births and other policy goals only enforce
traditional family norms, allow racial and gender discrimination and unjustly with-
draw government from economic support.29' They argue that the government is
forcing women into stereotypes without providing support for the unique and irre-
placeable role they choose or to which they are consigned. Single women with
children should not be deprived of support as a group, but each case should be ex-
amined individually with the premise being that ehch be provided with income
support and not work requirements. In his 1981 encyclical, Laborem Exercens,
Pope John Paul II supports the traditional gender and family roles of past pro-
nouncements, but he also supports a "welfare policy which insures a single mother
the ability to delay her entry into paid employment until her children are of school
age. 292 The Pope writes:
It will redound to the credit of society to make it possible for a
mother - without inhibiting her freedom, without psychological or
practical discrimination, and without penalizing her as compared
with other women - to devote herself to taking care of her chil-
dren and educating them in accordance with their needs, which
vary with age. Having to abandon these tasks in order to take up
work outside the home is wrong from the point of view of the
good of society and of the family when it contradicts or hinders
these primary goals of the mission of a mother .... 293
The Pope's comments indicate that he and the church he leads would sup-
port the traditional definition of family as the norm. Yet, he joins others less in-
clined to adopt a traditional role or definition of family, and indicates a preference
for economic support policies under conditions which foster work, rather than
mandate it. The mother and child are important, regardless of whether the child is
born into a non-marital relationship, and though the child may be a result of prom-
iscuity, that does not diminish the worth of the child or the entitlement of the
mother to a support level which would maintain her dignity and that of her child.
The balance is not between the promiscuity entitlement and self-sufficiency, but
rather between a child in poverty and a program which actively assists the parent.
The United States Catholic bishops are among those who criticize the new
290 See id. at 2213.
291 See generally MASSARO, SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 20, at 76-77; D. ERIC SCHANSBERG,
POOR POLICY: How GOVERMENT HARMS THE POOR (1996); BEN J. WATTENBERG, VALUES MATTER MOST
(1995); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY
(1994); PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA 1820-1920 (1978).
292 MASSARO, SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 20, at 140.
293 Id. (quoting Laborem Exercens at § 19).
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welfare law for its reliance on work as the solution to dependency. 294 Individual
solutions are preferred by the bishops and, for example, government-sponsored job
preparation programs are a prerequisite when work is possible. The bishops' voices
are distinctively important since they and their constituents are responsible for a
vast network of charitable organizations. These agencies and those of other reli-
gious organizations derive more than fifty percent of their operating budgets from
government funds.29 When government programs halt payments to women and
their children, these agencies will be impacted with increasing numbers of people
unable to meet the new welfare work requirements. The ability of these agencies to
meet an increased demand is questionable. According to Rev. Fred Kammer, presi-
dent of Catholic Charities USA:
If the religious communities alone were expected to make up for
the proposed cuts in government social spending over the next
several years, the task of replacement would require an average
annual increase of $225,000 in resources devoted to charitable
works from each of the nation's 258,000 churches, synagogues
and mosques. As a point of comparison, the .average total budget
of a congregation is only $100,000 per year.
If charitable efforts cannot meet the demand brought on by the decreasing
federal support, then people, particularly children, are at risk. Thus, "social policy
is constrained by a prohibition against harming poor children, or even serving as an
accomplice in situations where innocent children are placed at risk by the irrespon-
sible behavior of their parents. 297 After six decades of dependency, if government
withdraws income guarantees "[w]elfare mothers may thus find themselves forced
into desperate exchanges, choosing among items on a list of degrading social op-
tions which few would defend. '298 Among these social options would be prostitu-
tion, abortion, clinging to abusive boyfriends or abandoning children. These wel-
fare mothers and their children would best be served through a program of incen-
tives: "We must be willing to build into our welfare system responsibility and ac-
countability on the part of both the recipient and the giver of public assistance., 299
Critics of the giver of public assistance object to the new definition of who
is worthy to receive public assistance. When the government mandates work the
294 The bishops have established their own agenda for welfare reform. See ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR
ALL, supra note 285, at 186-214.
295 In 1994, Lutheran Social Ministries, Catholic Charities USA, and the Jewish Federations received
between 54 percent and 62 percent of their operating budgets from government spending. See Milt Freuden-
heim, Charities Say Government Cuts Would Jeopardize Their Ability to Help the Needy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
1996, at B8.
296 MASSARO, SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 20, at 84.
297 Id at 159.
298 Id. at 160.
299 Id at 162 (quoting CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA, supra note 51, at 12).
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effect is to force real women and their children into situations of moral depravity,
something some of the nation's religious organizations find abhorrent. The com-
promise offered by the critics of the government action is to emphasize the struc-
ture and the viability of marriage while at the same time providing for those who,
because of a variety of reasons, cannot meet that goal now. Thus, public policy
initiatives are recommended which would strengthen the family, foster responsibil-
ity, not singularly denigrate welfare dependency. The bishops and other critics of
the welfare legislation share with Professor Fineman a respect for the reality of
choices being made by individuals. 300 If the situation had been different and the
welfare recipient had purchased a home, been able to open a IRA or a Keogh Plan,
had been able to marry, or been able to make itemized deductions to a charity, the
federal policy makers would have provided economic support. The argument of
critics of the new welfare legislation is that welfare recipients make a contribution
by raising children and should be entitled to receive support even though these
children are not the product of a definition of family defined as marriage.
Thus, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 restricts the definition of family. In so doing, it reawakens marriage. If,
thirty years after the advent of no-fault legislation, private groups and state legisla-
tures are seeking to reinvigorate the tradition and definition of marriage, the ap-
proach of the PRWORA is too abrupt and too harsh. Professor Fineman, Catholic
bishops and a host of other social advocates would agree on this point. The legisla-
tion wants to be somewhere, the location of which has either been forgotten or the
journey too difficult to go alone. If advocates of a definition of family based upon
marriage want to make this the norm again, the process must be gradual and as-
sisted. The Florida legislation is better; the goal of process permeates the Florida
statute protecting marriage and preserving family. The Florida legislature makes
education mandatory in high school and seduces marrying couples into taking pre-
marital courses and pre-divorce counseling. Assistance and process are important.
Likewise, fairness in welfare policies demand no less of a process.
Catholic Charities USA offers ten social objectives which would replace
the welfare legislation's abrupt withdrawal of economic support. Each contributes
to a process which would take a welfare recipient from dependency to self-support.
The premise is that the definition of family incorporates marriage and mutual
commitment. But it is realistic of family structure and choices already made. The
ten objectives are:
(1) A vibrant economy must provide career opportunities;
(2) all workers need a level playing field;
300 See id. at 165 ("We must resist the temptation to see poor women, minority families, or immi-
grants as either passive victims or easy scapegoats for our society's social and economic difficulties."). The
National Commission on Children also recommends that government and private sector employers establish
family-oriented policies and practices, including family and medical leave, work schedules, earned income
credit, health care, juvenile services, parenting classes and tax programs such as the earned income credit, to
strengthen families. See BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 2, at xxix-xxxii.
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(3) the educational system needs major changes;
(4) adequate health care must be available;
(5) the supply of affordable housing must be increased;
(6) our society must provide greater support for family life;
(7) quality, affordable child care should be universally available;
(8) our society must place renewed emphasis on the value of mar-
riage;
(9) teenagers and young adults must have attractive life-options;
and
(10) America must address both the societal roots and the individ-
ual episodes of domestic violence.0 1
Interestingly, these social policy goals of the bishops mirror those of the
United States Congress's National Commission on Children and the legislative
findings of the Florida legislature. All emphasize the importance of fostering a
strong family to provide economic, emotional and developmental structure for chil-
dren and adults. These goals do not share the same premise as the new welfare leg-
islation. The PRWORA's objective is one of cessation of benefits rather than provi-
sion of support. Comparisons will have to be made to determine the effectiveness
and consequences of the new welfare legislation. To date, the full effect of the wel-
fare changes have not been documented; this will be difficult because federalism
has replaced the uniformity of AFDC.
30 2
Congress is modifying the welfare legislation by enacting into law ele-
ments of the bishops' social policy goals. To wit, there are tax incentives for busi-
301 MASSARO, SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 20, at 165 n.36 (quoting CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA,
supra note 51, at 4-5).
302 See id at 255 ("There are in place fifty different systems featuring various combinations of poli-
cies on time limits, work requirements, family caps, interstate migration, and subsidized employment.").
Some of the state efforts have already been declared unconstitutional. For example, state efforts to mandate
residency requirements before traveling persons may receive welfare benefits. See Saenz v. Roe, 67 U.S.L.W.
4291 (1999).
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nesses to hire former welfare recipients, Medicaid protection has been extended to
half the country's uninsured children, and there are minimum wage guarantees for
welfare recipients entering the workforce. Nonetheless, the block grant programs
still require the state to enforce time limitations on benefits, and work requirements
for single parents of children.30 3 More changes will ensue and increased litigation
and social results will provoke critics and supporters to hasten changes.304 Should
the country experience a severe economic recession the conditions for persons
without an economic safety net will become exacerbated. In the meantime, the new
welfare legislation seeks to fit mostly single mothers into a goal of family defini-
tion for which they are neither prepared nor now supported. They and their children
are thus at risk.
V. CONCLUSION
When Louisiana and Arizona codified the possibility of covenant marriage
for their citizens, the legislatures recognized a growing sentiment in those states for
a reawakening of marriage. While covenant marriage restricts covenanting parties
to a fault-based divorce, the purpose of the legislation and the theme of its reli-
gious-oriented supports is the strengthening of marriage. The impracticality of
covenant marriage will negate its effectiveness, but the renewed attention to mar-
riage begun in Louisiana, Arizona and other communities across the country will
continue to grow. Florida's Marriage Preparation and Preservation Act is the most
recent example and other states will likely adopt legislation to conform to a new
appreciation for marriage and the economic stability it could bring to adults and to
children.
Three undercurrents have brought about this cultural shift from no-fault to
covenant marriage. One is the litigation which surrounds the opportunity for per-
sons of the same-sex to marry. Newspapers and political pundits debated the merits
of marriage and in so doing educated citizens about an institution ignored, or
worse, moribund. People have formulated thoughts about what marriage is and can
mean in the lives of adults and children. Second, the new federal welfare legisla-
tion, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, put an end to sixty-one years of minimum economic support for welfare re-
cipients, mostly single mothers. By replacing the economic safety net of welfare
payments with work requirements, the federal government chose as a norm a new
definition of family: an economically sufficient single parent or two working par-
ents, presumptively in a marriage relationship. No longer would the government
303 See MASSARO, SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 20, at 256-57.
304 See, e.g., ANDREW BUSH ET AL., OFFICE OF POLICY AND PROGRAM ANALYSIS, LEAVING
WELFARE: FINDINGS FROM A SURVEY OF FORMER NEW YORK CITY WELFARE RECIPIENTS (Sept. 1998);
HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: STATES ARE
RESTRUCTURING PROGRAMS TO REDUCE WELFARE DEPENDENCY (June 1998); DAN BLOOM E" AL.,
MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORPORATION, THE FAMILY TRANSITION PROGRAM:




support single mothers raising children by themselves. Such a prompt shift in a
definition of family is commensurate with a reawakening of marriage and discour-
agement of individual choices. Third, state secular authorities are increasingly ac-
commodating "faith-based moral principles" into neutral state objectives. The Flor-
ida legislation providing for marital and divorce counseling is such an example of
faith-based incorporation by secular authorities. Thus, promotion of the religious
institution of marriage is accommodated in the state purpose of providing stability
and economic commitment within a family unit. State interaction with religious
organizations will reawaken marriage and offer opportunities for state and religious
organizations to achieve individual objectives.
These three societal undercurrents prompt the reawakening of marriage.
Covenant marriage, restriction on no-fault divorce and covenant communities are
all ramifications of this reawakening. Eventually, the state, for better or for worse,
will initiate more objective standards for marriage. The state is choosing marriage
as a social institution, indeed, an optimum social organization and current voluntary
efforts at premarital counseling, parenting classes and mandatory counseling upon
divorce will increase. In addition, the states will increasingly adopt the current vol-
untary programs into its secular educational efforts and mandatory premarital
classes. If the state utilizes religion-based programs to provide this education, new
opportunities will arise for the religious denominations currently conducting the
programs and for sociologists who will then be able to monitor more closely the
results.
If the institution of marriage does enjoy a reawakening, the issue then
arises as to the effect upon less formal personal commitments, domestic partner-
ships being one example. Will a renewed emphasis on marriage hinder or help do-
mestic partnerships or will all coexist? Whatever the outcome, the conclusion is
inescapable that there has been a shift in attitude, one which has seen a reawaken-
ing of an appreciation of that which has been a staple of human relationships from
Adam and Eve until the present.
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